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1. A PROFILE OF THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY. Characteristic problems, constraints, and 
opportunities, distinguishing construction from other industries 
The construction industry is characterized by several highly specific traits, which distinguish it from 
other industries and which confront the industry with rather specific problems. In the following, these 
characteristics and problems are shortly summariz.ed. Some are related to the product and the technologi-
cal and organi7.ational structure of the industry. Others pertain to the environment with which 
construction firms have to deal: the various markets and the state. 
1.1. The Nature or the Product 
• A major characteristic of the construction industry is that its products tend to be unique. They are single 
custom-made or 'one-off units and not easily substitutable goods, built to the specifications provided by 
the customer, highly subject to • individual or local • taste, fashion and architectural style. Series 
production is yet found only to a limited extent, e.g., in construction of some factory halls, wood skeleton 
houses, etc. 
• A seoond basic characteristic of the industry is production on the location of consumption, i.e., territorial 
immobility. Building products cannot be transported as the terms 'Immobilien' (German) or 'onroerend 
goed' (Dutch) indicate ('mobile homes', found mostly in the US, are more products of the woodworking 
industry than of construction). This has major consequences for the industry. 
• Furthermore, the products have a very long life-time, or temporal immobility. Investments and usage are 
tied down for a long period of time. 
• Even as they decay, building products can still be repaired. Therefore, a large share of construction work 
is maintenance work. In 1990 this accounted for 41 percent of total construction work done in the EC, 
only a bit less than new construction products (59 percent). In the housing sector, the proportion of new 
to maintenance work was even almost 50 : 50 (ERECO 1992: 418). 
1.2. Technological and Organizational Characteristics of the Industry 
• Territorial immobility makes concentration of production on one location (in 'factories') impossible. 
Rather than products being transported, machinery and equipment have to be moved regularly and if 
necessary assembled and disassembled. 
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- Toe unique~ and immovability of the product limil the use of traditional rationalizatwn methods 
(standardmltion, series production, division of labour) as well as the application of speciali7.ed machinery 
and advanced ~. as is usual in manufacturing. Economies-of scale are difficult to reallie. Industrial 
building methods, based on series production of prefabricated parts (walls, doors, floors) built in factories 
and assembled on the location of production, have made some inroads, but have yet been limited to 
certain types of products (housing, tunnels) as well as certain rountries . 
• As a result, the sector is characterized by a strong handicraft orientation and limited use of machinery. 
Labour intensity is high and capital intensily low. The fixed capital investment per worker is one of the 
lowest among all industries. In the Netherlands for example, the average investments in machinery per 
worker over the period 1964 to 1976 in construction amounted to only Hfl. 1,400. Of 12 industrial 
sectors, only the clothing industry scored lower. The chemical industry for example invested on average 
Hfl. 13,700 per worker, the food processing industry Hfl. 6,100, the metalworking industry Hfl. 5,300 (Van 
Waarden 1989: 9'J) 
• As a consequence, labour productivily is low in construction. It is on the whole about half of that of 
manufacturing, as table 1 indicates. 
Table 1. Labour Productivily in Construction as compared wilh Manufacturing (measured as contribution 
of construction to GDP in min. ECU divided by total employment in 1,000, 1985/86) 
Construction 
Manufacturing 
EUROPE 12 
20,960 
37,004 
USA 
29,431 
70,109 
JAPAN 
23,988 
48,200 
NB. The comparative high results of the USA might be due to the low value of the dollar. Hence the 
data cannot really be compared across countries. 
Source: Eurostat, Statistical Yearbook 1988, Series 4A and own calculations. 
• The technology of the sector has always been characterized by what Piore and Sabel (1984) have called 
'flexible specialization'. The machinery has to be transported regularly, and in order not to have to tranport 
to many different machines, the industry has an interest in machines and tools that can perform different 
tasks rather than only one specialized function. "The nature of construction markets has always required 
flexible production methods ... It had to obtain productivity objectives on the basis of unspecialized, multi-
purpose machinery. So the method of organizing the production process has always had those elements 
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now ronsidered to be 'new' in manufacturing industries, as they attempt to resolve the objectives of being 
highly flenl>le and highly automated at the same time.• (Rainbird and Syben 1991: 8) 
- Whatever is used ~ terms of machinery is often leased from leasing firms. Because of the spread-out 
locations and incidental use of some kinds of machinery it is often more economic to rent machinery 
from regional rental firms, e.g. cranes. Also, certain equipment (e.g. cement or asphalt mills with a fixed 
location) is often operated in joint ownership by several firms. 
- Given the low capital intensity and the leasing practices, not much capital is needed to create a firm, 
and not much money is lost by going bankrupL Hence in many subsectors the market-entry barriers are 
low and turnover of firms is high. For example, •as many as 30,000 small and medium building rompanies 
in the UK may stop trading in 1990. The increase in the level of bad debts in the sector over 1989 rould 
be as high as 40%, according to the latest Barclays UK Construction Survey" (Smith 1990). 
- Because production takes place on the location of consumption, and these locations are territorially 
dispersed, the industry itself is also one of the most terrilorially dispersed ones. Local demand is often met 
by locally founded, owned and oriented building firms. An indication of the dispersion is the fact that in 
the Netherlands for example, construction is responsible for between 5 and 7 percent of total employment 
in each of the 11 provinces. There is only a relatively small - although increasing - number of firms active 
at the national level, often through local or regional offices. The number of firms building in other 
countries is also relatively small. 
- Handicraft and flexible production methods, local orientation, low fixed capital requirements and hence 
low entry barriers explain the dominance of small jinns in this sector, not only in terms of numbers, but 
also in terms of combined share in sector employment and total outpuL Concentration of capital does 
not provide any organizational or technological advantages. Hence, 91 percent of all ronstruction firms 
' in the EC-countries has less than ten employees. They account for 39.5 percent of all jobs in construction 
in the EC (see table 2). 
Table 2 The Structure of Construction in the EC by Firm-Size 
Les.5 than 10 employees 
10-500 employees 
more than 500 employees 
Source: ERECO 1992 
Pet. of Firms 
91.28 
8.68 
0.04 
Pet. of Jobs 
3953 
50.75 
9.72 
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- Table 2 i.odicates also that the deglle of concenlTation in oonstruction is relatively low. The large firms 
(more than SOO employees) aa:ount for only 9.7 percent of total oonstruction employmenL The relative 
absence of large firms is one of the reasons why so few firms 'export', that is, build on foreign locations 
of oonsumption. The small firms are usually oriented towards the local markeL 
- The low degree of capital intensity implies limiud speciali:zation of firms on types of products (Many 
machines can be used only for one specific purpose. Tbeur presence hence implies specialization and their 
absence lack of such specialization). Firms building houses build also schools, factories, offices. Whatever 
there is in specialization is mostly found in civil engineering (road oonstruction, hydraulic works, 
tunneling, drilling and cable-laying, etc.) and furthermore in special trades, especially the finishing trades 
(painting, electrical installation, roofing) but also in basic oonstruction (masonry work, carpentry, 
scaffolding). 
- The small average firm-size and fierce mutual competition, resulting in narrow profit margins, do not 
allow the great majority of firms to invest in research and development activities. Furthermore, because 
it is difficult to keep technological secrets in an industry that literally works 'on the streets', it often 
does not pay to invest in the development of technology, esp. processing technology. Hence R and D 
investments are very much a collective good in this sector and prone to all the problems of collective 
goods provision, which are considerable, considering the structure of the industry. New product technology 
is often developed by the engineering oonsultancy firms which provide the principal with the product 
designs. 
- The large numbers of small specialized finishing trades, as well as the tradition of tendering and the 
; need to externalize risk has produced a high incidence of subcontracting in the sector. Main contractors 
often sublet certain types of work to small specialil.ed firms, either because they do not have the skill and 
manpower required, or because it is a way of reducing entrepreneurial risk (the main contractor is sure 
of a fixed price for parts of the job and can put pressure on his subcontractors to accept a very low price 
for the work). An extreme form is subcontracting to the self-employed, most of whom are one-man firms. 
As a result, mutual supplies within the sector form a high percentage of total outpuL 
- Given the small average firm-size, various forms of specialization, the regional orientation, the limited 
number of large firms, the high entrepreneurial risk (see further) and the construction at the site of 
consumption, construction firms often form temporary joint ventures or building combinations for large 
building projects. See for example the Channel tunnel, built by a consortium of three British and three 
French firms. In this way skills and experience can be combined and risk spread and shared. Furthermore, 
the number of competitors is reduced, allowing for better negotiating conditions with the principal. 
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- Because of the small firm siz.e, the low fixed capital requirements and the local orientation, the great 
majority ofv construction firms is family-owned. There is no separation of ownership and control of firms, 
no 'managerial revolution' here. Production cooperatives of construction workers exist also to some extenL 
The borderline with labour-suboontracting to the self-employed or to small groups of construction workers 
is often unclear. 
- Family-ownership, dependence on tendering, highly specific labour relations, etc. have favoured the 
emergence of a business culture, highly specific to the construction industry, a 'contractor' culture, because 
contracting as a way of getting work is such an important shared 'dependence', shared 'fate' of 
construction entrepreneurs. Notwithstanding the fierce and often destructive competition in the sector, 
this culture provides for a relatively high degree of social cohesion in the sector. 
- In some countries there is some public ownership of construction firms, either by tha national 
government, state companies (railroads) or municipal governments (e.g. 'direct labour' organi7.ations in 
Britain). 
- Foreign ownership is relatively rare in the sector. 
1.3. The Product Market 
- The relation between a construction firm and its customer is one of executor and instructor. Typical 
for the industry is the separation of product design and construction. The customer or 'principal' usually 
has a building design made first by an architect or engineering consultancy firm. The construction firm 
then builds the product according to the detailed drawings and specifications provided by the principal. 
He, or his representatives, possibly the architect, also supervise actual construction and inspect the 
product upon completion. In many cases, building construction is not more than a sophisticated way of 
labour subcontracting. The building firm is hence dependent on the customer for design, design changes 
during the building process, supervision, and approval. The principal in tum is dependent on the skill, 
speed, honesty and (financial) reliability (if the builder goes bankrupt the principal is left with a half-
finished work) of the builder. This continuous mutual dependency relation implies that the relation 
between customer and supplier can never be or remain an anonymous market relation. It is a longer 
lasting contractual relation, in which trust is important. The dependencies may also provide for more 
enduring relationships, when the investment in such a trust-relationship induces a principal who frequently 
gives out work, to prefer to work regularly with the same building firm. However, price competition and 
the practice of tendering (see further) mitigate on the other hand against the emergence of such longer 
lasting relations. Hence they are often found in more specialized areas, e.g. where a very large 
manufacturing plant such as a steel factory has constantly the same construction firm on its premises for 
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any construction work, or where the Postal agencies prefer to work over a longer period of time with a 
spedalired cable-laying firm. 
- A contruction firm has to sell something which has yet to be built, under conditions which are partly 
beyond its oontrol: the weather, the situation at the building location, the local supply of building 
materials (if the principal is responsible for it), the momentous relations on the local labour market, etc. 
This implies that there is a high entrepreneurial risk: the builder has to commit himself to do the work 
for a cenain price under conditions which he can only partly foresee. Furthermore, the specifications of 
the work to be done, as provided by the principal, are often rather vague. E.g. the builder has often not 
enough data to calculate reliably the amounts of the various building materials to be used (except where 
such calculations are provided by specialists, such as the quantity surveyors in Britain). Furthermore, 
workers may confront him with strikes near the finishing of a project, in the knowledge that the 
contractor might give in easier, given the contractual penalty for late delivery (an inducement of course 
to negotiate contracts that specify that strikes are a valid excuse for late delivery). 
- The separation of design and construction implies that a principal disposes already over detailed 
specifications of the product. He knows what he wants to build, what the quality will be of the design 
and of the building materials to be used. Hence he can limit competition in the construction phase on 
price competition and time and terms of delivery. 
- The industry is furthermore characterized by an asymmetric market structure, a series of temporary 
monopsonies, thanks to tendering being the predominant way of getting work. One customer invites 
tenders from various suppliers, and is hence in principle able to play them off against each other. The 
practice of tendering is one more result of the separation of design and production and of the product 
being sold before it is produced. It is a technique to concentrate competition on price competition. It is 
also found in other industries which build to order, such as the shipbuilding industry. Furthermore, 
government agencies are often required by law to give out construction work in public tender, in order 
to prevent favoritism. And as the government is a major customer of the construction industry (see 
further), this influences the overall market structure considerably. 
- Because of the limited degree of product specialization, the degree of functional market segmentation 
is also limited. As a result, there is usually a considerable number of competitors which confront each 
other. 
- However, regional market segmentation is quite significant. National housing markets are divided in a 
large number of regional sub-markets, each with its own architectural styles, price level and often even 
business cycle. The more so as the average firm-size is small and most firms hence build to local demand. 
This limits of course competition. 
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• Competition is often fioce, even destructive, forcing ronstruction firms sometimes even to bid under 
cost-price, depending on the business cycle. Fierce rompetition is the result of a number of structural 
characteristics mentioned before, such as low fixed capital requirements, low entry barriers, high firm 
turnover, small average firm-size, limited market segmentation (all resulting in a large number of 
prospective competitors), the practice of tendering, the uncontrollable and unforeseeable production 
ronditions, high chances of calculation mistakes, the transparancy of the market given the use of relatively 
simple production techniques and the visibility of production from the street (it is difficult to keep 
production secrets), and strong business-cycle amplitudes, because the industry is a major capital goods 
producing sector. Hence building capacity created for and during hausses produces fierce competition 
during baisses. The low fixed capital requirements for establishing a construction firm furthermore prevent 
reduction of overcapacity in the markeL Firms that go bankrupt may reappear the next day under a new 
name with only a few creditors less. Although there are also a few characteristics which reduce 
competition, such as the regional market segmentation and the fact that periods of no work don't cost 
so much because of the low capital intensity (labour is often hired on a project base), these are of less 
influence than those factors that enhance competition. 
- Given the need to produce on site of consumption, domestic markets are relatively closed and foreign 
competition is minimal, except in border regions. In addition, foreign competitors are kept out of 
domestic (and local) markets by different and often rather detailed (local) quality standards for buildings 
and civil engineering works, zoning regulations, tendering procedures and traditions, cartel agreements 
(in some countries) and informal local networks between business and politics. Hence, the sector is 
sheltered from international competition. Its dependence on external markets is rather indirect (through 
macroeconomic variables). As a result, the sector has no 'common external enemy' which could unify 
domestic producers and· aid in self-regulation. However, on the other hand, the absence of foreign 
competition facilitates in principle regulation of the domestic markeL It is a matter of debate whether 
the absence of international competition has retarded technological development in the sector and more 
in general the external competitive position of national industries. 
• Nevertheless, the 'expon' of construction - mostly export of know how and skilled workers, used for 
construction activity abroad - has become in the early eighties five times larger than in the 1970s. About 
5% of the world trade volume is construction export. But the leading construction exporters are Non-
European countries. The US has the highest world market share (45%) followed by South-Korea (9%). 
The European countries have a world market share varying from 8% (France and Germany) to 6% 
(Italy), 4.5% (UK) and 3.4% (Netherlands). These exports go to a large extent (about 80%) to Third 
World countries (C:zemy-Zinegger 1987: 351). The import of construction is of no major importance for 
Europe as a whole. Most 'exports' concern civil engineering. 
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- In the long run, the ~rs for construction products are relatively stable. People need buildings to live 
and work in, roads to travel on, etc. and these buildings decay over time and require repair or 
replacement Much IC$ than in other sectors is the maintenance and growth of demand determined by 
the development of new products. It is neither a 'sunrise' nor a 'sunset' industry. 
- Hence the share of construction in total employment and GDP is relatively stable over ~ and relatively 
similar across countries. In the 12 EC countries altogether the share of construction in the GDP was 55% 
(1985) and the share of total employment 7.2% (1986), which corresponds to about 8,8 million workers 
out of a total employment of 121.8 million. The constant share of construction in eronomic activity 
across countries, even those at different stages of development, is striking when one considers the high 
differences of European countries in other sectors. In 1989 the agricultural sector employed 50% of the 
working population in Turkey and only 2% in the UK. industry employed 40% in Germany and only 20% 
in Turkey, services employed 69% in the Netherlands and only 30% in Turkey. The construction industry, 
however, only ranges between 5.2% in Turkey and 9.3% in Spain (see Table 8: Percentage of employed 
people in construction). This confirms that construction activity satisfies basic needs in an economy, that 
its products have to be made on site, cannot easily be traded internationally, and that hence comparative 
national advantages are not really relevant 
- Because the sector satisfies basic needs it is also quite large. It is the second largest industry, second only 
to metal production, machinery and equipment (OECD National Accounts). 
- Notwithstanding the long-term stability, in the short run, the sector is prone to sharp fluctuations in 
demand, given its position as a supplier of capital goods and its dependence on government contracts (see 
further). Because of its high (and early) cyclical dependence, construction is a leading economic indicator. 
The employment situation in construction is e.g. an excellent indicator for the future development of 
unemployment and the length of unemployment in the whole eronomy (Erath and Wagner 1987: 107-
120). Construction projects are easily postponed in case of expected recessions and have high multiplier 
effects on the whole economy. 
- There is a large black market in construction, that is, illegal building activity, which is not registered 
with the tax and social security authorities. In some regions of Italy, it is estimated that more than half 
of the stock of new housing has been constructed illegally in the last decade (EC, Panorama of Industry 
1990: 26-6). 
- Construction of housing (either for new buildings or for the renovation of old ones) amounts to about 
65% of the European construction industry in 1988 (EC-Panorama 1990: 22-2, figure 2). This makes 
construction extremely dependent on demographic trends. 
12 
- Qualily control is necessary but difficulL Fierce price competition has induced entrepreneurs occasionally 
to use cheaper and lower quality building materials or to 'adulterate' their products in other ways. Not 
all principals or their representatives are knowledgeable enough or permanently present at the building 
site to uncover the disappearance of poor materials in later no longer visible parts of the building. 
However, poor building products can endanger both workers and users. Hence there is a need for 
consumer protection. 
1.4. The Capital Market 
- Although housing is sometimes also considered a consumption good, given their durability all 
construction products are usually considered investments, and they are among the most important invest-
ments in the economy. Investment of other sectors in building amounted to 338.5 billion ECU in 1985 
in the EC. That was a little over 10 percent of the combined gross domestic product of the EC-countries 
and 53 percent of all investment (Commission of the EC 1988: 26-1). This makes construction projects 
dependent on long term expectations and on long term financing conditions. 
- Construction products tend to be the most expensive goods most people buy in their lifetime. Therefore, 
it is rare that they are paid for in cash. They have to be financed. The durability of the product allows 
for that. The product can be used as security for the loan, which thus becomes a special kind of loan, 
the mortgage. 
- The cost of the loan, the interest paid over a long period of time, is usually a multiple of the price of 
the building itself. Hence the interest rate is often more important for the decision to buy or invest than 
the price of the building. That is, the price elasticity of the product is low. Construction firms can 
influence the demand for their products through their pricing policy only to a rather limited extent, the 
more so as they often can neither influence the price of the land on which is being built (see further). 
- As a consequence, interest rates, and more in general developments on capital markets, are a major 
factor influencing the demand for building products. The fluctuations on the capital markets are reflected 
rather directly in the fluctuations in building volume. And state interventions on capital markets (deficit 
financing, exchange rates, the discount rate) are hence also of major importance for the construction 
industry. 
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1.5. The umd Market 
- In many countries, especially in the urbaniz.ed areas, land prices are relatively high. That is, not only the 
price of the loan, but also the price of the ground on which is being built is often of greater importance 
for the overall price of the product than the direct building costs. Hence it too influences the demand 
for construction products to quite a significant degree. And public policy influencing such land prices 
(zoning law, spatial development plans, regional subsidies, price and selling regulations of agricultural 
land) are also of major importance for the volume and fluctuations in the demand for building products. 
1.6. The Machinery Market 
- Toe incidental tendency to lease machinery on site from local companies implies a occasional separation 
of ownership and use of capital goods. 
1.7. The Building Materials Market 
- The Building Materials Industry is a major input into residential and non-residential construction. It 
is just as the construction industry also a sheltered sector. The volume of imports and exports combined 
is less than 10% of total production due to high transport costs. 
- The building materials industry bas the following characteristics: 
. a large part of the industry consists of extracting raw material. This creates waste material problems; 
. the manufacture of construction materials involves combustion processes and therefore high energy 
consumption; 
. high weather dependence and seasonal fluctuations; 
. high dependence on transport costs since most materials are homogeneous mass products with low unit 
values. 
- Although the building materials industry depends highly on the construction industry, and notwithstand-
ing the limited importance of international trade, its production and employment patterns across countries 
are quite different. There are some big producers: Germany (23.7% of total EC production), the UK 
(20.6%), Italy (16.1%), France (15.1%) and Spain (11.8%). The other EC-countries have very small shares 
(Belgium 3%, about 2% for Denmark, the Netherlands and Portugal) (EC-Panorama 1990: 5-2, table 3). 
The whole building materials industry of the EC employed in 1988 502,673 people. On average, 
production of construction materials is 1.4% of manufacturing production in the EC-countries. 
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1.8. EnYi.roomental Effects 
- The industry poses various environmental problems. Fust and foremost to the users and the general 
public. People spend most of their time inside buildin~: homes, offices, factories, shops, hospitals, 
theatres, etc. Hence the qualily of the air inside such buildin~ is of primary importance for the well-
being and health of people. This quality is largely determined by the building structure: by the ventilation 
allowed by the isolation, by the heating and airconditioning systems, and by the building materials used. 
As several research studies have indicated, the quality of air inside is often worse than that of the air 
outside, even in industrial areas. Causes are amon~t others building materials such as asbest and 
formaldehyde in chipwood. Not only users, but also construction workers are exposed to the environmen-
tal hazards produced by such materials. 
- The sector is a major producer of waste materials. The German construction industry produced for 
example in 1990 120 min. ton 'Bauschutt' out of a total of 250 min. ton waste materials in that country 
(Report of Umweltminister TOpfer, Sildkurier Sept. 14, 1991) 
- However, the sector also uses and processes waste materials, e.g. stone waste in roadbeds or tyre-rubber 
in low-density asphalL Hence it does not only produce environmental problems, but also helps with 
solutions to such problems. 
- The soil of old industrial sites has contaminated over the years with dangerous chemicals (' Altlasten'). 
The clean-up is a rather expensive affair (in the Netherlands alone several tens of billions of guilders) 
and will provide work for the civil engineering, earthworks, and demolition branches in construction for 
many years to come, work however which will expose the workers to serious health and safety ha7.ards. 
1.9. The Labour Market 
- Given the low fixed capital intensity and handicraft production methods, labour forms an imponant cost 
factor (next to building materials). This implies that wage negotiations, whether with individual workers 
on the site, or collectively with trade unions, are of strategic importance to the sector. 
- The relative high cost of labour, in combination with the fierce competition, encourages the use of black 
labour and labour-subcontracting. 
- On-site-production, low capital intensity and high entrepreneurial risk have produced a tradition of high 
labour mobility, temporary work contracts and a low degree of company loyalty. Workers tend to stay in 
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an area rather than with a firm. They are hired only for the duration of a building project (or the part 
for which they are needed), and often leave for another project with another firm. This allows firms also 
to reduce capacity temporary when there is less work. aided by the low fixed capital costs. During hausses 
in the busin~ cycle, the high labour mobility has at times produced fierce competition on the labour 
market and wage drift, as individual workers play-off entrepreneurs against each other. 
- Hence real wages in construction tend to fluctuate quite a bit. as does the difference between real wages 
and wage levels regulated in collective contracts. This has occasionally endangered the legitimacy of the 
unions in the eyes of their members and forced unions to take periodically more radical positions. 
- The low capital intensity allows only for limited gains in labour productivity and hence for limited room 
for wage increases without affecting building prices. 
- The dependence on multi-taSk machinery, tools and materials, the goal of building unique products 
adapted to local physical conditions and under varying weather conditions, the importance of efficient 
organization of supply of inputs of machinery, materials and labour on the building site, and hence the 
importance of coordination between various activities, produce a need for relatively highly skilled workers. 
They have to know the possibilities of the various tools and materials and to have experience in handling 
them, they have to be able to improvise and take initiative, and they should be capable of overseeing a 
larger part of the production process in order to modify their own contribution to the total in such a way 
that coordination is maintained. Although there are also a sizeable number of low skilled jobs, the 
majority requires experienced and specially trained workers. Sometimes this is buttressed by state or 
corporatist regulations, e.g. the German and Austrian Handwerk Kammern and their regulations, requiring 
the use of skilled labour and specifying minimum numbers of years of apprenticeship. In Germany in 
1987, 48% of all construction jobs were considered for skilled workers and 17% were jobs for site 
management and technical and supervisory staff. Only 19% were jobs for semi-skilled and unskilled 
labourers (Syben 1991: 98). 
- Although dependent on skilled labour, the sector has problems with providing vocational training 
schemes. Skills of construction workers are not firm-specific, and given the high labour mobility,. 
individual firms have no incentive to invest in training and apprenticeships. It is quite likely that 
competitors will lure away labour in which they have invested. In short, the provision of vocational 
training is a typical collective goods problem. 
• On-site and outside production imply high dependence on the weather and on the climate. Especially in 
northerly countries this can at times be quite a problem. Continuity of production and employment during 
the winter is difficult. Hence the sector is regularly confronted with seasonal unemployment. This requires 
schemes to pay construction workers during this period, in order to maintain a stable supply of skilled 
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labour throughout the year. Furthennore, the dependence on the weather implies occasionally poor 
working conditions. 
- The sector has significant health and safety problems. The sector is one of the most accident-prone ones. 
The rate of fatal injuries is two to five times as high in construction as in manufacturing, depending on 
the counuy. In Germany there were in 1989 0.070 deaths per 1000 employees in construction, compared 
to 0.030 for manufacturing. For Austria the figures were 0.226 versus 0.082; for Italy 0.140 versus 0.020; 
for the Netherlands 0.048 versus 0.022; for Sweden 0.050 versus 0.030; for Switzerland 0.194 versus 0.040; 
and for the UK 0.095 versus 0.021 (ILO 1991; the data are difficult to compare across countries, owing 
to differences in registration methods). Furthermore, many types of work are physically heavy (carrying 
cement sacks, laying street tiles, working 20 hours straight when pouring concrete, etc.) and/or is done 
under poor working conditions (the weather). In addition, workers sometimes have to use poisenous 
building materials (asphalt, asbest). 
- The dependence on skilled workers and on their capacity for improvisation in order to deal effectively 
and efficiently with unforeseen problems at the work-site requires the work-organization to leave the 
workers a more than usual degree of autonomy. This, coupled with the mobility of labour, that is, the 
relative independence of workers of one specific employer, has fostered the emergence of a rather strong 
individualism among construction workers. This influences labour relations in the industry quite 
significantly. More than workers in other industries do construction workers rely on and trust in their 
own capacity to negotiate individually with the site supervisor. Hence, while product market relations in 
construction tend to be less anonymous than in many other industries, labour market relations are 
relatively more anonymous. 
- The relative independence of construction workers has made them into one of the more radical groups 
of workers. They have less to fear from lay-offs or other possible sanctions of employers. This has helped 
construction unions in reaching relatively high density ratios, notwithstanding the individual orientation of 
construction workers. 
- Furthermore, as a consequence, strikes are either large or frequent in construction, depending on the 
organizational structure of the trade unions and the nature of the labour relations in the various 
countries. In a country with a relatively low strike-rate, the Netherlands, construction was the sector with 
most working days lost due to strikes, even more than in the two other strike-prone sectors, metalworking 
and the transport sector (a.a. dockyards). In the period 1947-1982 26 percent of all working days lost 
because of strikes were lost in construction (or 1,053,910 days), although construction workers made up 
only about 11 percent of the total working population (Van Waarden 1989: 135). 
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1.10. Relations with Other Sectors, Intersectoral dependencies 
- On the whole, product substitution by products of other industries is minimal, and the danger is also 
relatively low. cars can be replaced by faxes, but people have to live and work somewhere, need roads 
to travel, waterworks to keep out or bring in water, etc. Only in some marginal branches is there 
competition from other industries, e.g. in the market for office and factory buildings with the steel and 
aluminum construction industry (part of the metalworking industry) and in the market for small housing, 
summerhomes, etc. with the prefab wood-skeleton products from the woodworking industry. Product 
substitution is much more prevalent in the building materials industry. However, this has hardly any 
consequences for the construction industry. It just uses other products. 
- There are some tendencies towards venica/ integration, that is, cooperation across sectors. First with the 
architects, engineers and finishing trades, integrating design and production. Large building developers 
provide customers with so-called 'turn-key' projects. Often however this involves only temporary joint-
ventures between designers and builders. Secondly, increasing attempts to apply industrial building 
methods and economies-of-scale have led to some vertical integration with the building materials industry. 
Larger firms produce standardized building segments (concrete walls, floors, doors) and assemble them 
themselves on site. Such forms of vertical integration have often been motivated by the desire to compete 
for construction works in other countries, esp. less developed ones, which do not have a modem skilled 
construction industry of their own for major building or civil engineering projects. 
l.ll. Relations with the State . 
- The sector is highly dependent on 'the state' as customer of the industry, as the state is usually 
responsible for infrastructural works as typical collective goods in society. In addition, the state has its 
own building needs and is responsible for public housing. Hence the sector is rather sensitive to levels 
of government investment, budget deficits and budget cuts, etc. Thus, e.g. in the Netherlands, national 
and local governments were involved in the demand for 52 percent of all building production and for 95 
percent of all civil engineering works - either as direct customer, financier, or as provider of major 
subsidies (data 1978; Van Waarden 1989: 119). 
- Most private construction is furthermore directly or indirectly subsidized by public authorities. Therefore 
construction demand is also for this reason dependent on the budget situation of the government, as well 
as on tax policies and tax-reforms improving income. 
- The sector is important for the realiz.ation of major macro-economic policy parameters, such as 
employment, economic growth, investment, infrastructure, and business cycle dampening. Combined with 
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the influence of the government as customer and subsidizer of the industry, the sector is often used as 
instrument for structural as well as business cycle economic public policy. 
- As investment in construction is more than 50 % of all investment, the sector is also highly sensitive 
to the fluctuations on the capital markets and hence to the policies of those state agencies influencing the 
jinancial markets: the Treasury or Finance Departments (budget deficits, government loans) and the 
National Banks (interest rates). 
- Dependence on the state as regulator of the industry. The sector is, compared to other sectors, relatively 
highly regulated, given: a) its importance for/influence on infrastructure and other building needs of the 
government, building safety, health and safety at work, regional labour markets, environmental problems, 
etc.; b) the manifolded problems of the sector (devastating competition, labour market fluctuations, 
problems with quality control or provision of vocational training) combined with the importance of the 
sector; and c) the sector's difficulties in self-regulation and private provision of public goods, given its 
structure (large number of small firms, fierce competition, etc.) 
- Given the large degree of state involvement, there are frequent and intensive relations between 
government agencies and (representatives of) the industry. The policy networks which arise out of the 
mutual dependencies between state and industry are however highly pluralistic in nature in most 
countries, given the fact that the industry is confronted with many different and relatively autonomous 
agencies acting on behalf of the state: various functionally differentiated regulatory agencies, state firms 
(telecommunications, railroads), and various state levels (local, regional and national government). This 
organizational fragmentation on the side of the state has in many countries also produced a highly 
differentiated and fragmented system of trade associations. 
1.12. Overall Characterization of Problems 
Many of these characteristics and problems can be subsumed under the problem of management of 
uncertainly and management of variability (Cf. Rainbird and Syben 1991: 9; Campinos-Dubemet 1988: 15). 
Uncertainty and variability result from a variety of characteristics of the sector: the uniqueness of the 
product; the different site conditions; the separation of design and construction and the limited 
information provided by the design and specifications; the practice of tendering; the strong fluctuations 
in demand; the changes in financial and housing politics of the state; the dependence on a skilled and 
relative autonomous labour force; the mobility and individuality of construction workers; the frequency 
of wage drift; the strike-proneness of the sector; and the political demands for environmentally conscious 
construction. 
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2. COUNTRY-DIFFERENTIATION 
The characteristics and problems mentioned in the aforegoing chapter are typical for the construction 
industry and are hence found in many countries. National construction sectors differ more in degree than 
in kind. In this chapter, some of those differences will be investigated. Attention will be focussed 
especially on the distnoution by firm-size, as the dominance of small firms is a major difference between 
the construction sector and other sectors studied in the 'Future of Industries in Europe' project. Hence, 
problems specific to small firms, and future perspectives of small firms, can be studied well in 
construction. Other characteristics of construction will be dealt with on a comparative basis in the 
following chapter, where national construction industries will be compared on their economic perform-
ance. 
2.1. Size or the Sector 
Table 3 provides data about the absolute and relative importance of the construction industry for 
employment in the various national economies. It rank-orders 21 OECD-countries by importance of 
construction. In Switzerland the sector is most important (almost 10 percent of total employment), in 
Turkey the leasL The table indicates that construction is responsible for between 5 and 10 percent of 
total employment, with most countries in the 6-7 percent range. This relative equality in size across 
countries (quite unlike other sectors) is an indication of the basic nature of the sector - it satisfies 
fundamental needs, present everywhere - of the fact that construction products have to be built on site, 
so that production capacity has to be evenly spread across space, and it reflects a relative similarity in 
labour productivity. 
20 
Table 3. Employment In construction as share of total employment (1989} 
employment in construction 
in 1,000 in% of total 
Switzerland 337 9.6 
Japan 5,780 9.4 
Spain 1,135 9.3 
Italy 1,800 8.6 
Portugal 365 8.3 
Austria 273 8.2 
Finland 199 8.1 
Australia 601 7.8 
France 1,575 7.3 
Norway 147 7.3 
Denmark 187 7.2 
UK 1,793 6.8 
New Zealand 97 6.6 
Germany 1,783 6.6 
Greece 239 6.5 
USA 7,680 6.5 
The Netherlands 397 6.5 
Sweden 290 6.5 
Belgium 225 6.1 
Canada 764 6.1 
Turkey 874 5.2 
Source: OECD 'Labour Force Statistics 1969-1989', Paris 1991 
2.2. Growth over time 
The sector shows not only 'stability' across space (more or less similar size), but also a long-term 
stability across time. Its share in total employment and production has remained relatively stable and has 
hovered between 5 and 10 percent. However, in the short run, business cycle fluctuations can be 
substantial, as has been argued in the foregoing chapter. Nevertheless, there are significant differences 
in this short-term instability between countries. As table 4 shows, country-size seems to be an important 
factor. Business cycle fluctuations seem to be especially high in the smaller countries, such as Denmark, 
Ireland, Portugal and the Netherlands. This could of course be expected: the smaller the industry, the 
fiercer the fluctuations. Interesting is however that among the small countries, the most corporatist ones, 
Austria and Sweden, show relatively low fluctuations. Hence corporatism does indeed seem to be able to 
moderate business cycle fluctuations. 
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Table 4. Change In construction production in real terms over previous years 
1981 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 
EC(excLGR,L) -4.S -28 -0.3 -1.3 -1.3 29 3.2 5.9 3.2 
Austria -4.0 -6.2 -1.0 -1.3 .6 1.3 1.6 3.6 3.5 
Denmark -15.1 .5 .6 4.9 9.3 14.0 -0.4 -5.8 -5.4 
France -1.1 -4.7 -4.7 -4.8 0.0 2.3 3.7 6.4 1.9 
Germany -4.7 -3.8 .9 .8 -6.3 1.9 -0.2 4.5 26 
Ireland 7.0 -9.0 -124 -9.0 -5.9 -4.9 -5.2 -6.2 5.0 
Italy -1.4 -6.7 1.1 0.0 -0.5 .8 -1.3 .5 1.8 
Netherlands -10.6 -6.6 -2.3 4.2 21 5.4 2.7 6.2 1.1 
Portugal 5.3 11.6 -28 -18.0 -5.8 7.4 10.0 10.1 7.0 
Spain -2.5 .5 -25 -5.S .5 5.0 7.0 10.0 10.0 
Sweden -3.5 3.9 -2.4 4.9 1.6 3.0 3.0 1.0 5.6 
UK -9.8 2.2 5.2 3.2 .8 3.5 8.0 9.4 3.2 
Source: EC Panorama of EC Industry 1990; for Austria and Sweden: OECD National Accounts (own 
calculations) 
2.3. Firm-Size: SM~ and TN~ 
As has been argued, a major characteristic which differentiates the construction industry from other 
industries is the dominance of small firms. This is a general characteristic found in most countries, as 
table 5 shows. The table compares the importance of small firms in construction with that in manufactur-
ing as a whole. 
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Table 5. Firm-Size in Construction as Compared to Manufacturing for Several Countries (only firms with 
20 or more employees) 
Percentage of employees by size-category in 
Manufacturing Construction 
GERMANY 
20-99 employees 14.2 73.7 
100-499 employees 24.2 17.5 
500 + employees 61.6 8.8 
FRANCE 
20-99 employees 23.8 47.9 
100-499 employees 25.0 23.4 
500 + employees 51.2 28.7 
ITALY 
20-99 employees 32.7 56.5 
100-499 employees 27.3 29.8 
500 + employees 40.0 13.7 
THE NETHERIANDS 
20-99 employees 34.2 54.2 
100-499 employees 31.9 30.7 
500 + employees 33.9 15.0 
UNITED KINGDOM 
20-99 employees 29.4 
100-499 employees 28.8 
500 + employees 41.8 
Source: Eurostat 'Structure and Activity of Industry', 1986-88, Series 4c; For the Netherlands Van 
Waarden 1989: 94. 
Table 5 gives still an incomplete picture, as data comparing construction with manufacturing was not 
available for firms with less than 20 employees. However, as table 6 - which only concerns construction -
shows, this category is especially important in construction. These data however have the disadvantage 
that they lump together quite different firm-sizes in the category 20 to 499 employees. Within this 
category again, smaller firms dominate, as incidental data may indicate. Thus in the Netherlands e.g. 98.5 
percent of all firms have less than 100 employees and these account for 71 percent of total employment 
(Van Waarden 1989: 94)). 
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Table'- Firm-Size in Construction by Country (all firms) 
Percentage of Employees by Si1.e-Category 
B-Belgium 
less than 20 employees (i() 
20-499 employees 40 
500 and more employees 0 
D-Germany 
less than 20 employees 48 
20-499 employees 43 
500 and more employees 9 
DK-Denmark 
less than 20 employees 54 
20-499 employees 36 
500 and more employees 10 
E-Spaln 
less than 20 employees 77 
20-499 employees 14 
500 and more employees 9 
F-France 
less than 20 employees 55 
20-499 employees 31 
500 and more employees 14 
GB-Great Britain 
less than 20 employees 54 
20-499 employees 28 
500 and more employees 18 
I-Italy 
less than 20 employees 81 
20-499 employees 16 
500 and more employees 3 
NL-Netherlands 
less than 20 employees 54 
20-499 employees 31 
500 and more employees 15 
P-Portugal 
less than 20 employees 47 
20-499 employees 53 
500 and more employees 0 
CH-Switzerland 
less than 20 employees 39 
20-499 employees 61 
500 and more employees 0 
Source: Hauptverband der Deutschen Bauindustrie 1988; for the Netherlands Van Waarden 1989: 94 
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Table 6 shows also that, although the dominance of small firms is a general characteristic, there are 
nevertheless differences in this respect as well between countries. Small firms are especially dominant in 
southern Europe. In Italy, firms with less than 20 employees ac.count for 81 percent of total employment 
in construction and in Spain for 77 percenL In most other countries they provide employment to around 
SO percent of all construction workers. Their share is especially low in Switterland, Portugal and 
Germany. In two of these countries, Switterland and Germany (as well as Austria), this is because 
institutional barriers (Handwerksrecht, vocational training, legislation to protect artisanal trades) 
complicate entry into the markeL Therefore, in these countries the very small firms (5 or less employees) 
are relatively absent. Here medium sized firms (6-50 employees) dominate (Kriesi 1984). 
Extremely small firms, one-man firms, are relatively prevalent in the anglo-saxon (Britain, and its 
former colonies) and latin worlds. An indicator is the frequency of self-employmenL Table 7, which 
compares this for a number of OECD-countries, shows that it is especially high in the UK (40 percent), 
the commonwealth countries New Zealand and Australia, the USA, and the southern European countries 
Greece, Italy, Spain, France and Portugal. It is low in the Germanic and Nordic countries. 
Table 7. Self-Employed as Percentage of Total Employment in Construction (1989) 
Austria 6 
Turkey 6 
Switzerland 7 
Germany 10 
Finland 16 
Sweden 17 
Canada 17 
Norway 18 
Denmark 18 
The Netherlands 18 
Portugal 20 
France 21 
Spain 22 
Japan 22 
Italy 23 
USA 32 
Greece 33 
New Zealand 37 
Australia 38 
The UK 40 
Source ILO 1991. 
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Notwithstanding the dominance of small and medium sized enterp~ (SMEs), there are also iarge 
firms in construction. Some of them are even trans-national enterp~ (TNEs). Large fi.rmS are 
particularly important (see table 6) in the UK, followed by the Netherlands, France and Denmark. where 
firms with 500 or more employees aa:ount for 10 percent or more of total employmenL Large firmS are 
totally absent in Swiuerland, Portugal and Belgium, and unimportant in Italy. 
Table 8 lists the largest firms in construction in Europe. It shows that French and British fi.rmS top 
the lisL These countries house together 20 of the 30 largest European firms. The table also makes clear 
that the largest firms make a substantial amount of their turnover abroad. For more than half of the top-
thirty 'exports' make up more than 20 percent of totaL turnover. For a few it is even around SO percent-
Most of the export-oriented firms are found in France and Britain, but a few of those with the highest 
export-share are German and Dutch firms. 
Table 8. The Thirty Largest Construction Firms in Europe (1990) 
Country Turnover in Exports as Employment 
min. ECU Pet. of Turnover (x 1000) 
1. Bouygues F 8,216.5 23.4 79.S 
2 SGE (Gtntrale des Eaux) F 5,651.8 40.7 68.3 
3. BJCC GB 5,388.6 44.0 44.4 
4. Tarmac GB 5,119.7 14.0 34.9 
5. Trafalgar House GB 4,7825 45.0 28.9 
6. Skanska s 4,659.5 11.0 31.7 
7. Philipp Holzmann D 4,532.7 47.0 36.8 
8. SAE F 3,897.6 31.0 26.4 
9. Dumez (Lyonnaise des Eaux-Dumez) F 3,796.4 
10. ltalstat I 3,339.8 23.1 
11. Spie Batignolles (Schneider) F 3,360.7 27.9 36.2 
12 Beazer GB 3,193.5 51.0 22.3 
13. GTM Entrepose (Lyonnaise des Eaux-D.) F 3,163.1 25.2 37.5 
14. AMEC GB 3,072.9 16.0 30.4 
15. Hochtief D 2,934.1 38.0 26.0 
16. NCC (Nordstjeman) s 2,925.4 9.0 18.7 
17. George Wimpey GB 2,638.9 24.0 16.3 
18. P & 0 GB 2,477.1 
19. Cegelec (CGE) F 2,2121 39.1 27.1 
20. John Laing GB 2,119.3 12.9 
21. John Mowlem GB 2,108.3 17.0 18.3 
22 Costain Group GB 2,058.6 34.0 14.8 
23. Bilfinder Berger D 2,054.7 48.0 44.6 
24. Dragados Y Construcciones E 2,008.2 14.0 
25. BPA s 1,995.1 18.0 
26. Taylor Woodrow GB 1,955.4 26.0 9.0 
27. HBG NL 1,819.0 50.0 15.1 
28. Groupe Fougerolle F 1,722.9 13.4 17.S 
29. Colas (Bouygues) F 1,696.1 32.4 22.3 
30. SIAB s 1,594.1 3.0 9.8 
Source: ERECO 1992 (who reports as source: Le Moniteur) 
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The division between SMEs and TNEs in construction is a major split within the sector, as both types 
of firms have quite different characteristics. SMEs are mostly general contractors using predominantly 
handicraft methods (although there is also a number of specialized firms renting or leasing out specialized 
machinery (cranes, drills, cable-layers) complete with skilled operators). They cater to local demand for 
small housing, maintenance and repair jobs. Large firms contract for larger projects in civil engineering 
and housing and commercial construction (large office complexes, shopping centres, complete neighbor-
hoods) and they find them throughout the country and even abroad. These large firms often use local 
small firms as subcontractors for specific parts of the job. 
Another difference between SMEs and TNEs in construction is that most small firms do acquire their 
work through tendering and are. concerned only with the building phase. Large firms, however, sometimes 
have integrated the design and construction phases and sell as 'project-developers' complete tum-key 
projects. The latter are hence less subject to the fierce competition which results from tendering. They 
compete with designs and quality, rather than with price, and are often able to obtain better profit 
margins. 
2.4. Labour Productivity 
Given the difference in markets where large and small firms cater to, larger ones are better able to 
apply advanced technology, often self-developed, such as the machinery that digs the Channel tunnel, 
various kinds of dredging material, or industrial building methods in housing construction. This is 
reflected in the higher labour productivity of large firms, as shown by table 9 for a number of countries. 
The table also shows that the differences in productivity between countries are si7.able. Labour 
productivity is low in Germany and high in France and Britain, countries where large firms are more 
important. (Spain and Italy score also high, but this may be due to specific factors. The spanish data do 
not include the finishing trades where possibilities to use advanced technology are even more limited. The 
high score of Italy might be due to a large share of production (estimated at SO percent of new housing) 
taking place in the black sector and remaining out of the statistics). Differences in labour productivity 
between countries are also related to the differences in demand. In Germany, renovation and improvement 
of the existing housing stock amounted to SO percent of the total building volume in 1990. In the 
Netherlands this was only 16 percent (Bierman et al 1991: 82). I.e. construction of new housing is more 
important in the Netherlands. This allows for greater use of industrial building methods and favors the 
larger firms in the sector, as renovation is more the typical market for small firms. 
Thus, many of the characteristics mentioned before pertain only to the small and medium sized firms 
which, although they dominate the industry, do not represent it exclusively. The characteristics mentioned 
should hence be differentiated by firm-size. 
27 
Table,. Labour ProductJvity or Large and Small Finns ror a Number or Countries (firms with more tbaO 
20 employees; data 1987) 
Firms with: 
BELGWM 
20-9') employees 
100-49') employees 
500+ employees 
Average all firms 
GERMANY 
20-9') employees 
100-49') employees 
500+ employees 
Average all firms 
FRANCE 
20-9'J employees 
100-49') employees 
500+ employees 
Average all firms 
ITALY 
20-9'J employees 
100-49') employees 
500+ employees 
Average all firms 
SPAIN (excluding finishing trades) 
20-9') employees 
100-49') employees 
500+ employees 
Average all firms 
UNITED KINGDOM 
20-9') employees 
100-49') employees 
500+ employees 
Average all firms 
Turnover in Thousand ECU per Worker 
54.7 
65.5 
94.2 
63.0 
48.1 
58.8 
73.2 
55.7 
56.5 
70.5 
80.2 
66.6 
77.9 
104.9 
108.5 
90.3 
56.0 
56.5 
90.3 
67.3 
60.3 
66.2 
69.5 
65.7 
Source: Knechtel 1992, Table 14 and own calculations. Here labour productivity is measured as turnover 
per worker. A more precise indicator would be gross value-added per worker (and is used in table 10,. 
chapter 3), but this data is not available for different size-categories of firms. 
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3. PERFORMANCE. EFFICIENCY AND EQUTIY 
3.1. Indicators or Perfonnance 
In this chapter we want to evaluate the economic performance of the construction industry in the 
different European countries. The performance of a sector can be evaluated by taking the attainment of 
economic objectives as a yardstick. Often, economic performance evaluation is restricted to criteria of 
allocative efficiency. However, we also intend to apply criteria of dynamic efficiency, of 'fair' distribution 
and of economic stability. The latter, referring to the dampening of business cycles through demand 
management by public authorities, is of special importance for the construction sector since the sector 
is a major producer of investment goods and hence not only reflects business cycle fluctuations but also 
influences them significantly. 
Allocative efficiency, in a strict neoclassical sense, is defined by Pareto-optimality, implying technical 
efficiency of production as well as the production of those goods that maximize the utility of consumers. 
One can argue that under certain limited conditions, perfect competition leads to Pareto-optimality. 
However, under conditions of market imperfections and externalities, the optimality of a real market 
economy may be doubted. Other governance mechanisms of a sector can perform better, even ifwe accept 
the ideal market as a point of reference. In the case of externalities, the Pareto-conditions do not hold. 
Furthermore, the formal conditions that have to be fulfilled for a Pareto-optimum have to be replaced 
by a set of loose but observable variables in order to operationalize the concept of allocative efficiency. 
Such criteria are, for example, low prices and costs, high productivity, profitability, market clearing and 
independence of subsidies (except in the case of externalities, where subsidies can increase efficiency). 
Dynamic efficiency refers to the sector's capacity for structural change and development in response to 
such changes in the environment as changes in demand, technology or market conditions. The concept 
of dynamic efficiency - in the narrow sense of innovative efficiency - dates back to Schumpeter (1942). 
While there are - at least theoretically - exact criteria for allocative efficiency, dynamic efficiency has to 
be defined in a less precise way, as, for example, a satisfying rate of innovation, high flexibility, etc. 
Criteria for dynamic efficiency are, for example, the diffusion of technological progress, product 
innovation, a sector's growth rate, and productivity increase. 
Besides efficiency, which takes the market as a point of reference, the 'fair' distribution of goods and 
income for transactors within the sector is a further economic objective. What a 'fair' distribution is, 
depends largely on the values of a society. While the neoclassical ideal market is the most efficient 
governance mechanism, its distributional outcome may be unacceptable from an ethical, social or political 
viewpoint. Criteria for 'fair' distribution are, for example, sufficient provision of affordable housing, 
improved income of producers, workers or housing-consumers. 
It is not easy to operationalize this performance indicator. Distribution - however defined as being fair 
- always means that some persons or groups are better off to the disadvantage of others. For this reason, 
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any operationalization of distnbutional performance implies the identification of the group which should 
be favored. This study deals with this normative question in a pragmatic way: since in addition to the 
state, formal associations play the key role in governing the sector and thus decisively influence the 
formulation of governance goals, the development of the construction firms' profits, workers' incomes and 
subsidies and loans for housing to households will serve as the point of reference. More specifically, 
distnbutional performance is understood as the governance system's capability of supporting the income 
goals of producers, workers and households. Such an operationalization is only a formal device for 
ranking the distributional outcome of governance systems. It does not imply any value judgement 
concerning the desirability of a certain income distribution. What is measured is nothing but the extent 
to which the interests of special groups are satisfied. 
Stabilization - i.e. the dampening of short term fluctuations - is important in the construction sector-
Since construction is a leading business-cycle indicator, many governments try to reduce business-cycle 
fluctuations by manipulating public expenditures in this sector. Furthermore, seasonal fluctuations are also 
significant in this sector. They may be reduced through incentive-systems or managing public demand for 
construction. Indicators for the performance in stabilization are short-term changes in construction output 
and unemployment, and in the development of public spending for construction. 
Figure 1 presents an overview of performance indicators and governance goals of the various interest 
groups involved. As argued, governance goals can either claim to improve efficiency in the case of market 
failures, or to improve the distribution of goods and income, or to stabilize short term fluctuations_ 
Performance indicators are related to sectoral governance goals, declared relevant by the governing actors 
involved. For instance, distributional performance in terms of improved welfare of consumers can be 
translated into the governance goals of provision of good quality and sufficient amount of housing. This 
makes it possible to analyze the sector's economic performance by proceeding from theoretically based 
indicators linked to politically relevant governance goals. 
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Figun 1: Performance Indicators and Governance goals of the Construction Sector 
Allocative Efl"Jciency 
- market clearing 
- over/undercapacity 
- subsidies 
- housing prices 
- profitability 
- productivity of labour and capital 
Dynamic Efficiency 
- change in productivity 
- change in the number and size of firms 
- diffusion of technical progress 
- flexibility of restructuring 
- product and process innovation 
- change in investment 
'Fair' Distribution 
- improved income of producers 
- improved income of workers 
- improved skill levels of workers 
- improved welfare of workers 
- less fatal injuries 
- less absence for sickness 
- improved welfare of consumers 
- good quality of housing 
- sufficient regional provision of housing 
- consumer price level of housing 
- loans and subsidies 
- interest rates 
- limited amounts of construction 
waste materials 
Stabilization performance 
- low fluctuations of unemployment rates 
- low fluctuations of output 
- low seasonal unemployment 
- countercyclical government spending 
Sectoral Governance Goals 
provision of a sufficient supply 
provision of adequate production capacities 
adjustment of production to demand 
increase in productivity 
rationalization of production 
protection of firms' income 
protection of workers' income 
protection of workers' skills 
health and safety of workers 
protection of domestic production 
provision of good quality housing 
provision of affordable housing 
environmental protection 
dampening of business cycles 
reducing unemployment 
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3.2. 1be Actual Performance or Construction 
Tables 10 to 14 give an overview of the ranking according to the performance indicators outlined. The 
choice of indicators was limited by the data available. The outcome can, therefore, be seen as a mixture 
of the theoretically wanted and pragmatically feasible. Especially the lack of data on profits and the 
inclusion of non EC-member countries into the study made the data research more complicated. 
The ranking applies to sixteen European countries: Eleven EC-countries (Luxembourg is excluded) and 
five EFTA-countries (all except for Liechtenstein and Iceland). The numbers in brackets at the end of 
each column show the ranking of each country according to the specific performance indicator. Countri~ 
for which no data for the specific indicator was available had to be left out in the ranking. Countries with 
equal values got 'shared in between' rankings. Thus two best countries with exactly equal scores both got 
(1.5). Countries with data for less than half of the indicators were left out in the total ranking of the 
specific table. In the final overall ranking only those countries were included which had rank-order scores 
for at least three of the four Efficiency-Equity-criteria. Thus overall ranking applies to twelve of the 
original sixteen chosen · countries. For Greece, Sweden, Finland and Norway not enough data were 
available. 
3.2.l. Allocative Efficiency 
(see Table 10a and 10b) 
Ten indicators were selected to evaluate static efficiency. Since many sector comparisons in economics 
only refer to efficiency, and especially to static efficiency, this indicator should be carefully interpreted. 
Column l measures labour productivity in construction as gross value-added per employee, high labour 
productivity being considered as more efficient. High productivity can be the result of a large and well-
developed stock of real capital (machinery), allowing for more productive work. It can also be the 
outcome of intensily organized and/or skilled labour. However, high labour productivity can also reflect 
'pitfalls' of international comparison. For example, high productivity can simply be the result of a general 
high price level and, therefore, high gross nominal output in the country (without being adequately 
reflected in an exchange rate depreciation against the ECU). We did not correct for such potential 
pitfalls, but rather tried to cancel them out by selecting a greater variety of indicators. Thus we included 
a second indicator of labour productivity in Column 2, which compares labour productivity in construction 
with overall labour productivity of the country. 
Column 1 shows that Belgium has by far the highest labour productivity and Portugal the lowest, a 
Belgian worker producing 34,600 ECU per year, about eight times as much as a Portugese worker 
produces and far above the EC-average. These extreme results are confirmed by column 2, which indicates 
that the Belgian construction industry has a higher labour productivity (104) than the total economy 
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(100). This is rather unique, since the construction industry is generally a low productivity sector. The 
Portugese construction industry on the other hand has 35% less productivity than the total economy. 
Significant differences in ranking can be found for Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany and France, 
who are high income countries and rank high in construction ECU-output per employed (rank 2, 3, 4, 
and 5) but low relative to other sectors of their economy (rank 9, 10, 75 and 11). 
Column 3 measures the percentage of workers employed in firms with 500 employees and more and 
claims to be an indicator for diversity of firm-size. In this sector, generally dominated by small firms, the 
presence of some bigger firms can be considered an asset They are better equiped to take up large 
construction tasks. Thus the sector as a whole has a more diversified and flexible structure. (A relatively 
high degree of concentration is 'bad' according to accepted economic wisdom, as it creates socially 
unwanted monopoly profits. However, in construction this danger is unlikely, given the large number of 
firms. Jn absolute✓ terms concentration is very low in this sector). GB, NL and F - highly industrialized 
countries - are leading, while B, P and CH have the lowest scores. 
Column 4 measures the percentage of self-employed in total employment as an indicator for labour 
market flexibility. A large amount of tiny, self-employed firms means higher flexibility to large firms (and 
hence to the sector as a whole), as they can externalize risks by subcontracting. High self-employment can 
be found in GB, I and GR, low self-employment in A, NL and D. High self-employment is typical for 
the anglo-saxon and latin world (see chapter 2), thus reflecting cultural differences in the data. 
Column S ranks the relative importance of the sector, measured by number of employees in percent 
of total employment. As can be seen from Table 10, the size of the sector varies quite a bit In CH, E 
and I, construction absorbs much more employment than in N, B and GR. Nevertheless, in all countries 
except N construction is (one of) the most important providers of employment 
While the first five indicators of static efficiency deal with real terms of input and output, the next 
five concern costs and prices. 
Column 6 compares gross hourly wages in construction in ECU. High costs are considered to be 'bad', 
being an indicator of inefficient use of resources. Here, again, a comparison has to neglect differences 
in the quality of output (higher costs can be justified for better work) and non-sector specifics of the 
country. Apper~tly, low wage countries like Portugal and Spain rank high also in construction, while high 
wage countries like Denma~, Switzerland and Germany rank low. Surprisingly, France has the third 
lowest wages in construction, which does not correspond with the country's average wage level. Surprising 
is also the big difference in wages. Wages in Denmark are eight times as high as in Portugal. 
Column 7 corrects wage differentials for price differences between countries. Since only changes of 
costs and prices were available, the consumer price index increase was deducted from nominal gross wage 
increases. This indicator is meant as a rough proxy for 'real costs'. The average real wage increase in 
construction between 85 and 88 was lowest in IRL, Band NL and highest in P, I and GB. 
Column 8 tries once more to evaluate the importance of costs in production, but now in relation to 
total costs. The column lists labour costs, an essential cost component in construction, as percentage of 
net production value (= total costs plus profit minus value added taxes). It can be seen, e.g., that F, 
,) , .. _. 
L 
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though having low construction wages, (column 6--rank 3) has a relatively high labour cost share of 
production (rank 7) which may be an indicator of inefficient (too much) use of cheap labour. GB and 
E have the lowest labour cost share (22.7% of net production value). 
Column 9 tries to evaluate profits. In a oompetitive sector, high profits are oonsidered to be indicators 
of good performance (in the long run profits should, nevertheless, tend to be zero due. to perfect 
oompetition). In a monopolistic sector profits would be oonsidered unjustified rents. Since construction 
is certainly a competitive sector (except perhaps in specialized submarkets) we rank higher profits as more 
efficient Profits are often a difficult variable to measure. Our profit indicator contains not only profits 
but also rents, insurance costs, depreciations, and interest payments and refers only to enterprises with 
20 employees and more. Profits are highest in E , I and D and the lowest in NL, B and IRL 
Column 10 investigates how cheap the sector can produce. Housing prices per square meter in ECU 
vary substantially among countries. Here, again, we have remember that price differences can also be due 
to general price level differences that are not reflected in the exchange rates or to substantial differences 
in the quality of housing constructions. Housing is cheapest in P, GR and NL, most expensive in B, A 
and CH. 
3.2.2. Dynamic Efficiency 
(see Table lla and llb) 
Though often neglected in sector comparisons, a sector's ability to adapt to changes in its environment 
is also an important indicator of efficiency. On this criterium the construction industry is evaluated in 
tables lla and llb. 
One indicator for dynamic efficiency is growth and development over time. Column 1 ranks countries 
by the average annual change in production volume between 1980 and 1989. High growth countries in 
this period in construction are P, DK and E; low growth is found in N (experiencing even a decline), IRL 
and F. 
Column 2 shows the change in employment between 1979 and 1989 in the sector. A growing, dynamic 
sector. should display an increase in employment (It could also be argued, that a dynamic sector 
substitutes capital for labour. But since construction is not a high tech sector, a decline of employment 
over a long period of time should rather indicate a decline of the importance of the sector.) Employment 
growth is highest in CH (56% i.e. 5.6% p.a. on average), SF and GB. Construction employment bas 
declined substantially in B, GR and F. 
Column 3 oompares the productivity growth in construction with that of total manufacturing, in order 
to take into account the sector's dependence on the country performance. The NL, P and DK have higher 
pr_oductivity growth in construction than in total manufacturing, as opposed to I, GB, A and B. 
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Column 4 takes change in investment of other industries in construction as an indicator of the change 
in demand for construction outpuL 1985 is 100. The highest increase in demand can be found in P 
(+65% between 1985 and 19CJ2), E and B. A decline in demand took place in N (-20%), DK (-8%) and 
SF (-3%). 
Column 5 provides an indication of construction acitivities abroad and relates that to the size of the 
domestic construction industry (number of employees). Building abroad is a relatively new development 
and hence a potential future growth factor. Those national construction industries that pitch into this 
trend strongest seem to be adapting more dynamically to changes in the market environment. Leading 
in construction abroad per employed are NL, B and F. The lowest scores show E, D and CH. 
Column 6 ranks investment of construction firms in percent of production volume. Investment is a 
decisive indicator of future performance. Data are missing for about half of the countries evaluated, 
making this important indicator less reliable than usual. Furthermore, the significance of the scores is also 
reduced since we have comparative data for only one specific year available. According to our scant data, 
the highest scores have IRL, I and B. Lowest scores have NL, F and D. The latter countries are known 
for their relatively technically and organiz.ationally well-developed industries. Perhaps those countries 
which have invested much in the past need to do so less at present. The high scores of IRL and B could 
hence be a catch-up effecL 
Column 7: The dynamics of a sector can also be seen in the speed with which it renews its machinery 
and equipment. Construction has on average shorter-lived machinery than other sectors. The average life 
of construction equipment is 12 years versus 19 years in manufacturing (Meyer zu Schlochtem 1991 ). D 
and CH have on average more modern machinery (10 years) than GB (26 years). 
Column 8: An important factor for future performance is the present investment in future skilled 
labour. An indicator is the number of apprentices as percent of total employment. Germany with its well-
developed vocational training system of the Kammern tops the list, followed by Denmark and Ireland. 
Low scores have B, F and NL 
Column 9 deals with the average age of houses. It could be assumed that the lower the average age, 
the more active the construction industry has been. To correct for the possibility that a country for 
various reasons has a large stock of old housing and hence building capacity is mainly devoted to 
modernization activity, we included Column 10 which measures housing modernization in total 
construction volume. The sum of both indicators seems more insightful, showing that D bas relatively 
young houses plus high modernization expenses, also NL and I. While B and IRL rank high in both 
categories and F in the middle in both categories. 
The total ranking of static and dynamic efficiency can be seen in Table 14 and is explained in par. 
3.1.5. 
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3.2.3. Fairness or Distribution 
(see Table 12a and 12b) 
Toe first two indicators in these tables refer to the welfare of workers, the rest to the interests of 
consumers. 
Column 1 lists the share of labour income as percentage of net value-added of the sector (net 
production value minus costs of raw materials). This indicator measures the distribution of earnings 
betw_een labour and capital A high share of labour income in total income is considered to be a 
protection of workers' income. The NL, Band Fare leading, E, I and GB rank at the end. 
Column 2 shows the number of fatal infuries per 1000 workers in construction in 1989. Under 
distributional aspects, injuries should be minimized to increase welfare of workers. P, IRL and the NL 
are leading. High fatal injuries are found in B, A and I. 
Column 3 takes once more housing prices per m2 into account. This variable is not only important 
as indicator for cheap and hence efficient production (table 10), but also refers to the consumer interests 
in cheap housing. P, GR and the NL have cheap houses, B, A and CH expensive ones. 
Column 4 provides a second indicator for cheap provision of housing, the average monthly rent for 
a comfortable unfurnished three-room apartment in a major city. Big differences with the indicator in 
column 3 are found in GB, E, and F. These differences might reflect regional differences between big 
cities and the rest of the country. 
Column 5 looks at the development of housing prices between 1979 and 1989. A decline of housing 
prices is positive for consumers. I, E and IRL are leading, GB, D AND DK have the highest price 
increases. 
Column 6 uses the number of houses per 100 households as a welfare indicator. Are there enough 
houses for everyone or is there a shortage? F, E and I are leading. The NL, A and IRL have the greatest 
shortage in housing supply. High scores might however also reflect unequal income distribution - very 
rich people having more than one house - and favorability as holiday country - many holiday homes in 
Spain and Italy. This would of course not be positive under distributional aspects. Furthermore, the high 
score of France might indicate a cultural characteristic - Frenchmen preferring not to travel abroad but 
rather having a summer house in their own country. Hence this date should be interpreted with care. 
Column 7 tries to include a dynamic component in consumer welfare. The number of newly finished 
houses per 1000 habitants in 1990 could be an indicator of the speed with which the construction sector 
alleviates housing shortages. However, construction of holiday houses might confuese the data, as the high 
score of Greece might testify. 
Column 8 and 9 provide indicators for the quality rather than the quantity of housing in terms of 
average size and facilities. D, GB, the NL and DK are leading in these two indicators. 
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Column 10 assumes that subsidies for housing serve distributional purposes. They are related to the 
GDP or Output of the housing sector, as calculated by Ford and Suyker (1990). Regrettably, data exist 
only for a few oountries. Of these, S and NL are leading. 
The total ranking on distributional aspects is presented in table 14 and par. 3.15. 
3.2.4. Stabilization 
(see table 13) 
Since oonstruction is a leading indicator for macro-economic outcomes like production growth and 
unemployment rates (see Marin 1984), it is often used by politicians to stabilize the economy. Increasing 
public demand for housing during recession is a typical Keynesian measure of macro-economic 
stabilization. Therefore, macro-economic indicators are included in this study. Since it can be argued that 
other factors - like openness or size of the economy - are much more important for explaining 
fluctuations in overall output than fluctuations in the construction industry that spill over into the whole 
economy, less variables were included in order to give this aspect less weight in the final overall ranking. 
Nevertheless, stabilization of the construction sector is an important economic policy goal and, therefore, 
should not be left out. 
Column l calculates the average of the absolute annual changes in GDP-growth rates as a simple 
indicator of business cycle fluctuations. The result show that size of the country seems to be of inluence 
and not only any possible stabilizing effect of the construction sector. 
Nevertheless, Column 2 shows that there is strong correlation between the fluctuation in real GDP 
and in construction output. Exceptions are the small countries IRL and A. where construction output is 
more stable than the whole economy's output and S where the oppposite holds true. 
Column 3 and 4 provide data on the development and size of aggregate unemployment rates of the 
economy. There is a high correlation between the average overall unemployment rate in the 1980s and 
the unemployment rate of 1988. The EFTA countries are leading with the lowest rates; E, IRL and B 
have the highest ones. 
Column 5 ranks countries by unemployment rate in construction. As can be seen, unemployment rates 
in construction vary substantially among countries and are higher than overall unemployment rates for 
most countries, thus indicating increasing unemployment rates in the following year. 
Politicians can influence the output and unemployment rate of an economy by means of the 
construction sector also indirectly through interest rates on housing. Housing is a typical long-term 
investment that is postponed if interest rates are high. Therefore column 6 lists interest rates on housing. 
The lowest interests are found in CH, D and S. The highest in A. GR and GB. 
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3.2.S. Overall Performance 
(see Table 14) 
Table 14 ranks all countries according to the four categories of performance criteria developed. The 
overall ranking within each category and for all four categories together was done by calculating the 
average rank-order for each country. Countries with less than half of column indicators available were 
not ranked in the specific category. Countries with less than three performance indicator-rankings were 
not ranked in the final total score. The last column provides the macro-performance ranking of countries 
according to the World Competitiveness Report (1991), which compared countries on 320 variables. This 
allo-ws us to compare our construction industry ranking with overall national performance. 
The results indicate that there are different classes of 'successful' construction industries. First there 
is the category of 'rest does poor countries' (E, GB, and I), countries in which construction has a good 
static efficiency performance, but where this is partly due to the fact that the rest of the economy in these 
countries does worse. These are low price/low labour cost countries, that inspite of having comparatively 
low labour productivity, perform well relative to the rest of their economies (see tables 10 and 14). 
Countries with a comparatively high labour productivity in construction, like B, CH, NL, D and F, 
rank low in overall static efficiency either because of the even better productivity performance of the rest 
of their economies (CH, NL, D, F) or because of high output prices of the sector (CH, B). They range 
in the middle field except D, which is among the 'loosers' in static efficiency. These 'loosers' (D, DK. A) 
are high wage/high price/relatively highly concentrated national construction industries (see tables 10 and 
14). 
The second group of 'successful' construction industries are the 'catching up' countries, with a low 
degree of overall industrializ.ation and a good performance in dynamic efficiency (P and E). The Spanish 
increase in construction volume and employment is supposedly partly due to the World Exhibition and 
Olympic Games activities, while the Portuguese is due to housing construction and modernization. 
The third group of 'winners' are the 'established modernizers' (DK. D). They are well-developed 
industrial economies, that due to high costs rank low in static performance, but are rather active in 
housing modemiz.ation and training efforts, thus (with P) leading in dynamic efficiency. 
Among the 'loosers' in dynamic efficiency are A, B and IRL This is due to little or even negative 
changes in production volume and employment, and to the existence of old housing stocks and relatively 
little modemiz.ation efforts (see tables 11 and 14). 
In the sum of static and dynamic efficiency ranking the 'rest does poor' low cost countries and the 
'catching up' countries (E, P) are leading, while the 'established modernizers' (D, DK) rank in the middle. 
The 'loosers' in combined efficiency are the NL, F, B, and A The Nehterlands ranks in the middle of 
both single efficiency criteria, while F and B lack dynamic efficiency due to stagnation in output and high 
losses in employment. Austria performs bad in both categories. 
38 
The founh group of 'winners' are the 'social welfare oriented' rountries (NL, D) that score high in 
equity. They provide safe working environments to labour and cheap rents and good quality housing to 
ronsumers. The Netherlands is known as one of the furthest developed welfare states and this is reflected 
in high srores in all subrolumns of table 12 (except rolumn 6). Germany performs well in labour force 
indicators and in quality standards of housing. Portugal performs also well in the cheap provision of 
housing (Portugal's extremely low fatal injuries might rather be due to statistical reporting errors). The 
four indicators available for Sweden indicate that it would also belong to the category of socially oriented 
rountries and score high on equity if more data on this country would have been available. 
Among the 'loosers' in equity are CH, GB and A High rents and low labour income are characteristic 
for Britain, high housing prices and high fatal injuires for Switzerland and Austria. The latter might have 
to do with the more risky work in tunnel and mountain construction. That Austria, the ideal typical 
corporatist country, ranks last in equity might reflect a tendency of corporatism to externalize costs to 
consumers. Since our welfare indicators concentrate on the welfare of consumers, the contribution of 
corporatism to equity, that is, to the welfare of workers, might be underestimated. 
The fifth and last group of 'winners' are the 'stabilizers' (S, CH, D, A), which seem to try to influence 
construction activities to dampen fluctuations in overall output and employment. They either do this by 
countercyclical management of public demand (S, D, A) and/or by providing low real interest rates for 
housing (CH, D, S). Construction is a leading indicator of the economy, but the causal relationship 
between the data has to be further analyzed. It is certainly a greater merit of the small open economy 
of Austria to moderate fluctuations in output than for the large German economy. The better ranking 
of fluctuations in construction output than of fluctuations in the whole economy in Austria seem to 
indicate that construction is indeed an important stabilizing instrument. The good Swiss results on the 
other hand could reflect Swiss macro-level employment policy (keeping domestic unemployment rates low 
by using foreign workers as a buffer) and its low interest rates due to its strong position as a financial 
center. The 'loosers' in stability are the high unemployment countries GB, E, B and IRL 
The 'overall best perfonners in construction' are Germany. Portugal, the Netherlands and Spain. 
Germany, the 'established modernizer', fairly 'socially oriented' and a 'stabilizing' country, ranks in total 
best. This ranking in construction corresponds to the ranking in overall macro-economic competitiveness 
of Germany according to the World Competitiveness Report 1991. A similar result holds true for the 
Netherlands, which is better in static efficiency but worse in dynamic and total efficiency, best in equity 
but worse in stabilii.ation. The Netherlands is number three in overall construction performance and 
number four in macroperformance. The two 'established' winners are joined at the top of the total 
ranking by the two 'catching up' countries Portugal and Spain. P performs better than E in all categories 
except static efficiency. Besides being 'catching up' countries, they also have in common that they perform 
very well in construction but rank at the bottom in general macro-economic competitiveness performance. 
The small countries Austria, Belgium and Ireland are among the overall construction 'loosers'. The 
bad performance of Austria is partly due to the lower efficiency performance, a finding which is not 
unexpected, since corporatist countries aim at equity and stability at the cost of efficiency (fraxler and 
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Unger 1990). The very low ranking of Austria on equity has been explained by the lack of data on 
workers' welfare. However, Austria does seem to use construction effectively to stabilize the economy. 
The overall bad construction results (number 10) do not correspond to the top ranking of the Austrian 
economy as a whole (number 3). Belgium ranks in construction among the lowest in all categories except 
static efficiency where it is in the middle-range. Ireland ranks at the bottom but data are partly missing 
(for static efficiency). The Belgian and Irish construction industry rank worse than the overall economy, 
were both countries score in the mid-range. 
3.2.6. Some Surprising Findings and Final Remarks 
The results are sensitive to the choice - dictated by availability - of indicators and to the weights that 
are given to them. Nearly every country can be a 'winner' if the data are only slightly manipulated by 
leaving out columns or criteria of evaluation. If we would have concentrated on traditional sector 
comparisons, the Netherlands would not have shown up among the first three but among the last three 
countries (see efficiency ranking table 14). If we would have eliminated column 2, 4 and 5 in Table 10a, 
the Netherlands would have been leading in static efficiency with still quite a lot of convincing indicators 
left, etc. This arbitrariness of data and indicator choice is the reason why we rather tried to include as 
much information as possible and to interpret the results unweighted by classifying types of performers. 
Some of the results did not correspond to our own a priori guesses. Especially the top ranking of the 
'catching up' countries Portugal and Spain was surprising, as well as the low ranking of the Austrian 
construction sector, since in some fields like tunnel construction it has world-wide fame. But it is, 
nevertheless, a high cost, high price and unsafe sector. That Britain ranks so low in overall construction 
performance is due to its low scores in equity and stability. In a traditional sector ranking restricted to 
efficiency it would be in the top ranking. The biggest surprise has been the 'invisibility' of France. One 
cannot imagine a report on the European construction industry without France. Many of the largest 
European construction firms are french as has been shown in chapter 2 Nevertheless, France performs 
at medium level. It is quite good in static efficiency (number 4) but bad in dynamic efficiency (number 
10), with as a result not so well in total efficiency (number 9). It is fairly good in equity and stability 
(numbers 6 and 5). As a result it ends up as number 5 in overall construction performance. This is a 
better ranking than the french economy as a whole has. A similar pattern is found in Italy, which is better 
in efficiency terms but not so well in equity and stability, thus ranging behind France. But unlike France, 
the Italian construction industry performs better than the whole economy . 
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k 10a. Stalic Efficiency in IN Construction Industry 
1ntry labour Productivity Coostruction: Diversity by F111D-Size: 
Pet. Workers empt by 
in ECU in pet. of Total FlllllS with 500 
Productivity employees or more 
1989 1989 
(1) (2) (3) 
34(,()(} (1) 104 (1) 0 (9) 
25360 (4) 78 (75) 9 (55) 
24200 (7) 78 (75) 10 (4) 
18872 (10) 92 (25) 9 (55) 
24975 (5) 73 (11.) 14 (3) 
21100 (9) 92 (25) 18 (1) 
, 6420 (11) 86 (4) 
~21~ 
(8) 83 (5) 3 (7) 
29800 (3) 74 (10) 15 (2) 
4080 (12) 65 (12) 0 (9) 
24737 (6) 80 (6) 
30560 (2) 76 (9) 0 (9) 
le 10b. Static Efficiency in IN Construction Industry (cont.) 
mtry Cmts: Costs: Costs: 
Gross Hourly Real Annual Wage labour Costs in 
Wages in ECU Increase 85-88 % Net Prod.Value 
1988 1987 
(6) (7) (8) 
7.00 (6) 1.0 (2) 31.0 (6) 
8.89 (10) 33 (6.5) 40.7 (8) 
12.89 (12) 3.0 (4.5) 
432 (2) 6.0 (9) 22.7 (1.5) 
5.82 (3) 3.4 (8) 32.6 (7) 
6.79 (5) 7.7 (10) 22.7 (15) 
7.09 (8) 8.7 (11) 23.2 (3) 
6.06 (4) 03 (1) 26.2 (4) 
8.02 (9) 1.7 (3) 27.1 (5) 
1.49 (1) 17.0 (12) 
7.05 (7) 33 (65) 
10.21 (11) 3 (4.5) 
tes on Data Table la and lb: 
olumn 1 and 2: Gross Value added per employed. Source: Knechtel 1992: Tab. 19 
olumn 3: Hauptverband der deutschen Bauindustrie 1992, for NL van Waarden 1989:94 
olumn 4 and 5: labour Force Statistics 1969-89, OECD, Paris 1991 and own calc. 
olumn 6: Source: Knechtel 1992, Tab. 30 
olumn 7: Nominal wage increases, average 1985-88, minus CPI. Own calculations 
o\umn 8: Source: Knechtel 1992, Tab 21 
Flexibility: ReLSize Sector: 
Self-Employment No. of Employees 
as% of Total in% of Total 
Employment Employment 
1989 1989 
(4) (5) 
22 (45) 6.1 (15) 
10 (12) 6.6 (11) 
18 (85) 7.2 (9) 
22 (45) 9.3 (2) 
21 (6) 7.3 (75) 
40 (1) 6.8 (10) 
23 (3) 6.4 (14) 
27 (2) 8.6 (3) 
9 (13) 65 (12.5) 
20 (7) 8.3 (4) 
6 (14) 8.2 (5) 
9.6 (1) 
17 (10) 6.5 (12.5) 
16 (11) 8.1 (6) 
18 (85) 1.4 (16) 
'Profits' in Housing Prices 
% Net Prod.Value per m2 in ECU 
1987 1987 
(9) (10) 
4.8 (7) 975 (13) 
7.2 (3) 555 (6) 
588 (8) 
16.2 (1) 548 (5) 
5.3 (5) 577 (7) 
6.8 (4) 539 (4) 
275 (2) 
11.6 (2) 635 (9) 
5.2 (6) 
4.1 (8) 471 (3) 
191 (1) 
756 (12) 
713 (11) 
olumn 9: Sum of rents, interest rate payments, insurance payments an profits in enterprises with 20 employees or more. Source: Knechtel 
~ Tab. 21 
:Olumn 10: Source: CZemy 1990: 69. lncl. VAT 
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Table lla. Dynamic Efficimcy of the Construction Industry 
Country Annual Change in Employment Annual Productivity Cllange in Investment Comtructioo Abroad 
Change in Prod. In Pet. between Change in c.on.str.in of other Industries in S per Employee 
Volume in Pet. Relto Total Manuf. in Coostr.between In Comtr. 
1982-92 1~ 1979 and 89 1985-1992 1989 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
B 1.6 {6) -21.0 (15) -1.6 (7) 140 (3) 3711 (2) 
D 13 (15) -7.6 (10) 0.0 (55) 125 (5) 569 (10) 
DK 3.8 {15) +8.7 (5) 0.2 (3) 92 (14) 1636 (7) 
E 3.6 {3) +8.9 (4) 0.0 (55) 155 (2) 390 (11) 
F 05 (13) -14.5 {13) 0.1 (4) 120 (6) 3493 (3) 
GB 1.9 (5) +10.9 (3) -2.4 (9) 110 (10.5) 2030 (5) 
GR -18.4 {14) 
I 0.6 (115) -11.8 (12) -3.7 (10) 113 (8.5) 1434 (8) 
IRL -2.4 (15) 113 (8.5) 
NL 1.3 (7.5) -10.8 (11) 1.1 (1.5) 117 (7) 5924 (1) 
p 3.8 (1.5) -2.7 (9) 1.1 (1.5) 165 (1) 
A 1.2 {9) +0.7 (8) -1.8 (8) 126 (4) 
CH 2.0 (4) +56.0 (1) 110 (10.5) 928 (9) 
s 0.8 (10) +1.4 (7) 102 (12) 2569 (4) 
SF 0.6 (11.5) +13.1 (2) 97 (13) 1909 (6) 
N -0.8 (14) +3.5 (6) 80 (15) 
Table llb. Dynamic Efficiency of the ConslTUction Industry (conL) 
Country Investment Average Service Training Effort: Average Age of Housing Moderni-
Ratio Lives of Machinery Apprentices as Houses in Years 7.ation in Pet. 
and Equipment in Years Pet.of total Empt. Total Coostr.Volume 
1986 1987 1984 1985 1990 
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
B 5.7 (3) 0.3 (10) 48.1 {11) 10.7 {10) 
D 3.4 (6) 10 (1.5) 11.3 (1) 38.7 (4) 23.1 (2) 
DK 7.7 (2) 44.5 (8) 23.7 (1) 
E 4.4 (4) 4.6 (6) 34.2 (1) 4.9 (11) 
F 3.2 (7) 12 (3) 0.8 (9) 44.1 (7) 165 (7) 
GB 3.5 (5) 26 (5) 6.5 (4.5) 44.0 (6) 22.1 (3) 
GR 
I 5.9 (2) 18 (4) 1.2 (7) 38.5 (3) 21.8 (4) 
IRL 6.5 (1) 6.9 (3) 46.5 (10) 15.4 (8) 
NL 2.3 (8) 1.0 (8) 34.9 (2) 20.7 (5) 
p 6.5 (4.5) 41.4 (5) 
A 46.0 (9) 20.1 (6) 
CH 14.5 (9) 
s 10 (1.5) 
SF 
N 
Notes on Data Table 2a and 2b: 
- Column 1: Source: FlEC 6/92 and own calculations 
- Column 2: Source: OECD 1991b 
- Column 3: Source: Knechtel 1992, table 20, and own calculations 
- Column 4: Source: graphs FIEC 6/92 
- Column 5: Source: Knechtel 1992, table 23, OECD Labour Force Statistics 1991 and own calculations. Data on S only in 1985. , 
- Column 6: Domestic Supply of Building Machinery as pet. of Production Volume. Source Knechtel 1992, tables 13 and 36, and ov,; 
calculations 
- Column 7: Source: Meyer-zu-Schlochtern 1991, Working Paper No. 57, OECD, Department of Economics and Statistics. Average life 
machinery in construction in 13 OECD<0untries is 11.9 years. In Manufacturing in the same countries 19.3. 
- Column 8: Source: Knechtel 1992, Table 26. Data for Spain and Ireland 1988 
- Column 9: Source Knechtel 1992, Table 9 
- Column 10: Source: Knechtel 1992, Table 3 and own calculations 
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)le 12.a. Di.rtribU!ional Perfonnance of the Construction Industry 
llntry Labour Income Fatal Injuries per Housing Prices Av.Moothly Rent for Average Annual 
as Pet. of the 1,000 Workers per m2 in ECU a Comfort.Unfurnished Rise in Housing 
Sum of 'Rest' in Construction 3-Room Apartment Prices minus 
and Labour Income in a Major City in USS Cons.Price Index 
1987 1989 1987 1989 1979-89 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
86.6 (2) 0.260 (13) 915 (13) 602 (9) -0.5 (5) 
85.0 (4) 0.070 (5.5) 555 (6) 532 (6) +0.5 (9.5) 
0.080 (7) 588 (8) 473 (5) +0.5 (9.5) 
58.4 (8) 0.353 (15) 548 (5) 1,090 (15) -1.7 (2) 
86.0 (3) 0.261 (14) 511 (7) 963 (14) -0.7 (4) 
76,9 (6) 0.098 (9) 539 (4) 1,245 (16) +2.3 (11) 
275 (2) 423 (3) -3.5 (1) 
66.7 (1) 0.140 (11) 635 (9) 612 (10) +0.1 (1) 
83.4 (5) 0.042 (2) 554 (8) -1.6 (3) 
86.8 (1) 0.048 (3) 471 (3) 434 (4) -0.2 (6) 
0.001 (1) 191 (1) 361 (1) 
0.226 (12) 756 (12) 534 (1) +0.3 (8) 
0.134 (10) 713 (11) 698 (12) 
0.050 (4) 416 (2) 
0.085 (8) 694 (11) 
0.070 (5.5) 846 (13) 
,le 12b. Distributional Perfonnance of the Construction Industry 
Jntry Housing Supply: Quality of Housing: Housing Subsidies: 
No. of Houses Finished Houses Average House 
Size in m2 
Various Years 
Between 1981-87 
(8) 
Houses with Bath/ as Pet. of Sectoral GDP 
per 100 Households per 1000 Inhabitants Shower in % of Tot.No. at Market Prices 
of Apts.Var.Yrs Various Years 
1988 1990 Between 1981-87 Between 1981-86 
(6) (7) (9) (10) 
106.1 (1) 4.4 (11) 82 (4.5) 76 (8) 
104.6 (10) 4.1 (12) 86 (2) 99 (1) 
104.1 (12) 4.7 (9) 107 (1) 87 (4) 
120.2 (2) 7.0 (2) 84 (3) 
120.4 (1) 5.6 (5) 82 (4.5) 85 (6.5) 
105.6 (8) 3.1 (13) 98 (2) 
10.7 (1) 
116.5 (3) 5.1 (7) 86 (5) 
L 100.0 (13) 5.5 (6) 85 (6.5) 
96.3 (15) 6.4 (3) 97 (3) 
116.0 (4) 4.5 (10) 66 (7) 58 (9) 
96.9 (14) 5.0 (8) 
108.7 (6) 6.3 (4) 80 (6) 
105.2 (9) 
109.8 (5) 
104.2 (11) 
tes on the Data Table 3: 
:otumn 1: Knecbtel 1992, Table 21 and own calculations 
:Olumn 2: ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1991; data Belgium 1986, Denmark 1988 
:Olumn 3: Source: Czerny 1990: 69 (in OS); exchange rates OS to ECU taken from Knechtel 1992 
:Olumn 4: World Competitiveness Report 1991 
:Olumn 5: Knechtel 1992, Table 29, World Competitiveness Report 1991, and own calculations 
:otumn 6: Knechtel 1992, Table 6, and Czemy 1990, Obersicht 9 
:Olumn 7: Knechtel 1992, Table 2, Data Greece 1988, probably including holiday homes 
:Olumn 8 and 9: Knechtel 1992, Table 7 
:Olumn 10: Ford and Suyker 1990, Tabel 6 
2.7 
5.4 
15.2 
11.5 
18.4 
(5) 
(4) 
(2) 
(3) 
(1) 
' 
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Table 13. Performance of Construction as Inmummt of Economic Stabiliz.ation 
Country Average Annual Average Annual Average 0.-Crall 0.-Crall 
Ructuatiom Ructuatiom in Unemployment Uoemployment 
in Real GDP Growth Comtr.Outp.Growth Rate Rate 
1979-88 1979-88 1980-88 1988 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
B 1.80 (14) 3.98 (11) 11.1 (14) 10.0 (12.5) 
D 1.30 (5) 3.43 (5) 6.9 (7) 7.6 (8) 
DK 1.78 (13) 5.40 (12) 8.3 (9) 72 (7) 
E 0.98 (2) 3.38 (4) 17.8 (16) 19.1 (16) 
F 0.96 (1) 1.83 (1) 9.0 (10) 10.0 (12.5) 
GB 1.42 (6) 351 (6) 9.9 (12.5) 8.3 (10) 
GR 156 (10) 65 (6) 7.7 (9) 
I 1.14 (4) 235 (2) 9.7 (11) 11.8 (14) 
IRL 204 (16) 3.60 (7) 14.1 (15) 16.7 (15) 
NL 1.43 (7) 3.87 (9) 9.9 (125) 9.2 (11) 
p 1.85 (15) 8.96 (13) 7.6 (8) 5.7 (6) 
A 150 (9) 3.36 (3) 3.3 (4) 3.6 (4) 
CH 1.66 (12) 3.96 (10) 0.6 (1) 0.6 (1) 
s 1.10 (3) 3.78 (8) 26 (3) 1.6 (2) 
SF 1.45 (8) 5.0 (5) 4.5 (5) 
N 1.62 (11) 2.5 (2) 3.2 (3) 
Notes on Data Table 4: 
- Column 1: OECD 1990, Table 3.1, p. 48, and own calculations 
- Column 2: Knechtel 1992, Table 41 and own calculations 
- Column 3: OECD 1990 and own calculations 
- Column 4: Knecbtel 1992, Table 25 and own calculations 
- Column 5: OECD 1990 
- Column 6: CZerny 1990, graph 13, p. 92 
Table 14. Average Rank-Order Scores of National Construction Industries by Performance Category 
Rank 
Nr. 
TOP 
MIDDLE 
RANGE 
BOTTOM 
AVERAGE RANK· ORDER 
Static 
Efficiency 
E 
GB 
I 
F 
B 
CH 
GR 
NL 
p 
D 
DK 
A 
Dynamic 
Efficiency 
p 
DK 
D 
E 
GB 
NL 
CH 
s 
I 
F 
A 
B 
Static and 
Dynamic 
Efficiency 
E 
GB 
p 
I 
D 
DK 
CH 
NL 
F 
B 
A 
SCORES FOR 
Equity Stabilization 
NL 
p 
D 
IRL 
E 
F 
DK 
I 
B 
CH 
GB 
A 
s 
CH 
D 
A 
F 
GR 
I 
NL 
p 
DK 
GB 
E 
B 
IRL 
Unemployment 
Rate 
in Construction 
1988 
(5) 
15.6 (9) 
65 (4) 
5.3 (2) 
20.4 (10) 
14.9 (8) 
28.0 (11) 
6.0 (3) 
126 (7) 
31.9 (12) 
11.5 (6) 
5.0 (1) 
7.0 (5) 
Real Interest 
Rates oo 
Housing 
1988 
(6) 
6.9 (5) 
55 (2) 
9.2 (9) 
7.4 (6) 
7.9 (7) 
6.8 (4) 
8.0 (8] 
3.0 (1] 
5.8 (3: 
Overall Overall 
Performance Macro-economic 
of Construction Performance*) 
D 
p 
NL 
E 
F 
CH 
I 
GB 
DK 
A 
B 
IRL 
D 
CH 
A 
NL 
m: 
SF 
GE 
B 
s 
IR! 
N 
F 
I 
E 
p 
GE 
*) Total macro-economic rank-order on the basis of 320 variables. Source: The World Competitiveness Report 1991'. 
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4. GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS 
4.1. Iodmdual F'mn Strategies to meet Uncertainty and Variability 
Construction firms have tackled the problems of uncertainty and variability in different ways. First of 
all, they have tried to find solutions individually. Campinos-Dubemet 1988 (quoted in Rainbird and Syben 
1991: 9) distinguished two strategies which construction firms pursue individually: extemaliz.ation and 
internaliz.ation of variability. 
The first, externalization, refers to the practice to reduce uncertainty and variability by passing (part 
of) the risks on to others. Campinos-Dubernet mentions as example the strategy of subcontracting 
segments of the job to other contractors or to individual workers or groups of workers (labour 
subcontracting). In this way, the main contractor is at least certain about the price that that part of the 
job is going to cost him. In turn, the subcontractor may do the same: subcontract part of his work again. 
One could add other strategies of risk-externalization. A second one is sharing risks with others, i.e. 
spreading them. For larger construction projects, firms often enter into temporary joint ventures or 
'building combinations'. These are not only motivated by the need to bundle a variety of experiences, 
expertise and resources, but also by the need to reduce risks. Thirdly, firms meet the uncertainty of work 
flow by hiring production factors only when they are needed, rather than buying them or employing them 
permanently. Thus, machinery may be leased, with or without operator, when actually needed. And 
workers are hired only for the period when there is work for them. This practice is reflected in the 
prevalence of short-term labour contracts and high mobility of construction workers. Fourthly, a not 
infrequently practiced strategy is to go broke when problems become to great and to pass the risk on to 
the creditors, among them the agencies collecting taxes and social security premiums. As indicated, the 
limited needs for fixed capital investment make it relatively cheap and hence easy to go bancrupt and to 
enter the market the next day again with a new firm. This is reflected in the high turnover rates of firms. 
Internalization of variability refers to the practice of increasing the adaptability of the own organiz.ation 
to any possible changes in the environment. This can be done first of all also by hiring the right 
machinery and labour only when actually needed. Secondly, a firm can strive to increase its size, to engage 
in a larger number of building contracts, and to employ a variety of specialized machinery and workers • 
which are bought or hired more permanently - at the different construction sites as needed. A third 
method is to increase the multi-task character of machinery and workers. This implies that contractors 
do not only have an interest in hiring more comprehensively trained workers, but also in job rotation 
schemes, which could further broaden the qualifications of their workers. Fourthly, to improve the 
adaptability of the organization at the workfloor, workers are given greater discretion and autonomy to 
act as they see fit, in the face of changing organizational or physical conditions. 
However, construction firms have not only pursued individual strategies, but also collective ones in 
trying to meet uncertainty and variability. They have formed more or less formal and more or less 
:l 
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permanent associations which have tried to change the environment, that is, the situation at the different 
markets, through mutual agreements and regulations. And they have lobbied third parties such as 
associations of suppliers or customers and state agencies to assist them in such forms of self-regulation. 
or even to assume the responsibility for market ordering and regulation when self-regulation turned out 
to be too difficult to realize. Thus, collective strategies have involved regulation, formulated and/or 
implemented by different organizations (state agencies, semi-state agencies, private associations). Together, 
rules and organizations form different 'governance arrangements'. 
In this section, such governance arrangements will be discussed, using two policy areas as example: the 
attempts to mitigate competition on the product market, and the attempts to provide a collective good 
such as vocational training, which should aid firms in increasing their internal adaptability. It will be 
shown how different and/or similar the construction industry in various European countries has 
approached these tasks. 
4.2. Collective Strategies: Attempts to Reduce Risks and Fierce Competition on the Product Market 
One important cause of uncertainty in construction is competition on the product market, which is as 
indicated, in the absence of regulation, for various reasons extraordinarily fierce in the construction 
industry. The practice of tendering pits one principal against various contractors and creates in principle 
(but dependent on the business cycle) market asymmetries; the craft-like production methods and hence 
limited need for fixed capital investment facilitates market entry - increasing the number of competitors -
and market exit and hence turnover of firms - decreasing the reliability of construction firms as contract 
partners; limited market segmentation increases the prospective number of competitors for a job; the 
necessity to commit oneself to a price for a product which has yet to be build under conditions partly 
beyond one's control and of which the specifications and designs provide often only limited information 
creates considerable risk, the possibility of faulty calculations and tempts contractors often to bid too low, 
especially under the threat of fierce competition; and given the size and price of construction projects, 
most contractors build only a few products at the time, which makes risk-spreading difficulL Competition 
in baisse-periods is further increased because the handicraft tradition and the practice of short-term 
employment contracts induce unemployed construction workers sometimes to establish a small firm of 
their own, thus increasing the number of competitors even more. 
The fierce competition is to the detriment of many parties involved. Construction firms themselves are 
sometimes forced to produce below cost price or have at least narrow profit margins, too small to finance 
amongst others research and development activities and to secure their external competitiveness in the 
long run. They are under pressure to produce fast and, this being on temporary sites where technical 
installations have to be assembled and disassembled, such assemblage is often done with less care than 
necessary, thus endangering construction workers. In other ways too, the competitive pressure threatens 
health and safety at the workplace. This explains at least partly the high accident-rate in construction. 
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Thirdly, the interests of customers too are at risk. Competition may tempt contractors to built too 
quickly, to use poor quality building materials - which may not easily be discovered once the building is 
finished - or in other ways to 'adulterate' their products. Furthermore, bancruptcies of contractors half-
way a building project - not uncommon in the past - are neither in the interest of customers, as it will 
cost them usually much extra to get the work finished by someone else. 
For these and other reasons, in many countries various forms of regulation have been introduced in 
the past in construction, to reduce uncertainty in price bidding, to offset the power of the principal in 
tendering, to limit market entry, to improve the 'quality' of entrepreneurship, to guarantee product 
quality, or to mitigate and order competition in other ways. The absence of foreign competition facilitated 
the effectiveness of such forms of regulation. Similar types of regulation are found in other industries, 
such as the printing industry and retailing, which share some of the typical characteristics of construction: 
small firm-size, family-ownership, handicraft tradition, low fixed capital requirements, workers establishing 
themselves easily as businessmen or labour-only subcontracting, fierce internal competition, and absence 
of foreign competition. 
In many countries the government has allowed if not stimulated or even taken responsibility for such 
regulatory measures. Not only for reasons of industrial policy - the construction sector being important 
for employment and economic growth - but also because the government has a direct interest in 
regulating competition in construction, both in its role as major customer of the industry and as protector 
of public health and safety. It does not only have an interest in low building prices, but also in good 
quality work and in stability and reliability of construction firms. 
However, the ways in which competition is regulated and the agencies which take responsibility for such 
regulations differ significantly between countries. 
4.2.1. Market Entry Regulation 
Market entry limitations exist in most countries. They are however of different kinds. Furthermore, in 
some countries state agencies assume most responsibility, whereas in others the regulations are initiatives 
by private interest associations which are, at the most, condened by the state. 
The strongest case of state control of entry to the construction market is found in West Germany. 
According to the 'Handwerksrecht' (law of artisanal firms) contractors in many building trades are required 
to seek admission to the Chamber of Artisans, before they can engage in construction work. Admission 
depends on passing the Master (Meister) exam and this requires three years work in apprenticeship, 
several years work as a journeyman and finally the following of a two-year 'master' course. Not the firm 
as organization, but the proprietor or one of his employees is licensed - as artisan. 
The Handwerksrecht is not specific to the construction industry, but applies to 125 trades. Only 23 of 
these belong to the building industry, among them carpentry, masonry and most finishing trades. It does 
not cover the whole construction industry though. Firms using non-artisanal production methods, as in ; i 
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large scale housing projects or main bitumen roads, do not require a certified anisan. But where the 
license is required, it is not easily obtained and this especially limits entry. By requiring different licenses 
for different trades, Handwerksrecht creates a segmentation of the market and it makes entry into a 
specific trade by a certified anisan from a neighbouring trade difficulL The bricklayer who wants to 
engage in painting or roofing has to follow the long route of training to certification once more - or 
he must hire a Meister roofer/painter. The Handwerksrecht has a long history and goes back to the 19th 
century, a time when the German state was strongly interventionisL This gradual development was 
brought to a conclusion by the Nazis in 1933. The Meister-privilege was not uncontested after 1945, but 
as early as 1951 it was fully reinstituted and survived the postwar changes to more liberal economic 
legislation. Comparable arrangements exist in the other Middle-European Germanic countries Austria and 
Switzerland. 
A somewhat similar, but much less effective system is found in the Netherlands. Firms, operating as 
main contractors need a general building or a general civil engineering state license. For subcontracting, 
there is a different one, more easily obtained. These licenses are required under the Vestigingswet 
Bedrijven 1937 (Act on the Establishment of Firms), created during the economic crisis of the 1930s, with 
the specific aim to restrict competition by limiting entry to the market. It is, just as the Handwerksrecht 
in Germany, not specific to the construction industry but relates to most artisanal trades and retailing. 
An important difference with the German system is that the licenses are much easier to get. Only one 
or two management and trade courses are necessary, and the subcontractors license requires only a 
general management course, similar to the one all shopkeepers have to take. Secondly, the licenses have 
a more general character, with a few exceptions of special licenses for a.o. roofing and paving. The 
different specialist trades are hence not separated. Trades, which in Germany may require special hard-
to-get licenses as those of carpenters and bricklayers, can be carried out in the Netherlands relatively 
easily. Only the general management course (basic bookkeeping etc.) for the subcontractors license is 
necessary. 
Other countries, such as Great Britain have no state control of market entry whatsoever. As a 
consequence, there is much self-employed labour in Britain (40 percent of the total work force in 1989) 
and hence a blurring of the dividing line between entrepreneurs and labourers as well as between formal 
and informal business. 
Although the state is in principle responsible for these forms of regulation of market entry, it is to a 
varying degree assisted by business' interest associations (BIAs) of construction in implementation. 
In Germany, the involvement of associations in carrying out state policy is laid down in law. The 
construction guilds and their peak association, the Zentralverband des deutschen Beugewerbes (ZDB), 
play an important role in interpreting and operationalizing the rules of Handwerksrecht and in 
adjudicating conflicts between different specialties over Handwerk privileges. They develop for instance 
the curricula for the training of Meister in the different crafts, which are subsequently made legally 
binding by government decree. In this way they demarcate the different crafts, as the training-content 
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determines what a Meister is entitled to perform. The guilds - and the regional general Handwerkskam-
mem to which they belong - also administer training. This is the very core of their activities and power. 
In the Netherlands there is also some formal assistance by business' interest associations. The latter 
set up and operate the courses which prospective businessmen in construction have to follow, in order 
to become entitled to a license. The main assistance of associations to the state rules is however 
unofficial Many organizations have become self-appointed police. Their officials regularly check lists of 
tenders and of newly established firms to track down illegal contractors and report them to the state 
authorities. They also urge their members to look out for moonlighters at building locations and some 
have even specialists on the road for this purpose. The general construction association NVOB has in 
addition created a special foundation for suing dabblers in court. Thus associations take up not only 
police tasks but prosecuting tasks as well. They support state regulations too by admitting only certified 
contractors as members to their organization and thus to the use of the selective services they provide. 
In the absence of state regulation, construction associations have tried to regulate market-entry 
themselves, but making such self-regulation effective turned out to be rather difficult. Thus, before the 
Dutch state regulated market entry, Dutch associations entered into 'exclusive trade agreements' with 
associations of suppliers of building materials in order to limit market entry to members of the 
association. Such contracts were comparable to closed shop agreements and entailed that members of the 
one association were allowed only to supply or buy from members of the other association. Both 
associations profited from the deal. Their members were favoured as against unorganized firms. For the 
latter it became practically impossible to practice the trade. They were denied raw materials or clients. 
Thus the associations could control market-entry through their member-admission policy. Existing 
members at the time of the agreement became automatically 'recognized craftsmen'. Newcomers got this 
status only by being admitted as members, when they satisfied certain criteria of skill, professional 
knowledge, experience and creditworthiness. In the long run the agreements were not viable, among others 
because of the fragmentation of the associational system. Exclusive trade agreements could not be effective 
when important associations remained outside the deals. Hence in time BIAs had to ask the state to back 
up or replace such private regulations. At present, such agreements have, as restrictive trade practices, 
become illegal under EC-legislation. 
Still, associations try to get preferential treatment for their members by clients thus limiting the number 
of real competitors on the market. They define their members as 'recognized craftsmen', pursue a 
supposedly restrictive policy of member admission, develop a 'house style' with which their members 
should present themselves, advertise for this house style and try to convince national and local state 
agencies, architects and other clients that they should only assign work to these 'recognized craftsmen'. 
Thus in Britain, wthe Institute of Roofing set up by the national Federation of Roofing Contractors has 
as one of its objectives 'to confer a recognized status on individuals in the industry'w (Grant 1983) In the 
Netherlands, several well-developed specialized associations in civil engineering, which maintain close 
working relationships with the one or two state agencies who are their main if not sole customer, have 
succeeded in securing preferential treatment for their members. Principals are very suspicious of bidders, 
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which are no members of these associations. However, the contradictory result of this is that these 
asoociations have a very high density ratio, which makes membership less exclusive and henc.e does not 
really limit competition very much. Hence, in general the effectiveness of such attempts to regulate 
market-entry has been low. 
4.2.2. Selective Tendering 
An alternative for limiting entry to the general construction market as a means of reducing competi-
tion is limiting eligibility to specific tenders. This however requires the cooperation of the principal. 
Where the state is customer of the construction industry, it may reduce fierce competition in the general 
economic interest of the industry through this customer-role. Rather than inviting any firm to bid for the 
contract, as is done in public tendering, a customer can invite only a few firms whom he knows to have 
the right expertise and equipment, have shown to be commercially reliable, have access to the necessary 
finance or are judged to be of the right size required for the object to be built. This is called 'selective 
tendering'. The principal may also decide to invite only one firm for bidding. In this form of 'single 
invitation' all manifest competition is absent. 
Selective tendering is the main mechanism by which the British state helps in reducing competition. 
In the mid-1970s 77 percent of public sector contracts in civil engineering and 65 percent of those in 
building were issued through selective tendering. Sometimes an ad hoe list of tenderers is drawn up anew 
for each project. But for many types of work the authorities use a fixed short list of firms with whom they 
have had good experiences. These lists often vary by size of the job, listing firms in other size-categories. 
Thus this type of selective tendering creates a market segmentation or classification system by firm size. 
This informal selective practice fits the preference for informal procedures in British legal and 
administrative culture and the relatively broad discretionary powers British civil servants have (Cf. a.o. 
Vogel 1986, Van Waarden 1992). 
'Selective tendering' and 'single invitation' are also in the Netherlands frequently used to give out 
contracts. 92 percent of all building and 70 percent of all civil engineering work is given out in this way 
(Van Waarden 1989). However, unlike in Britain, the state is not the principal who does this most 
frequently. Single invitation is used most often in maintenance work, mainly for private persons, and in 
subcontracting. Selective tendering is used often by state owned firms (the telephone and public utility 
companies). For typical work given out by central state agencies, such as road construction and main-
tenance, waterworks and public housing renovation, there is usually no restricted entry to tender. Selective 
tendering is not used by the Dutch central state to assist the industry in reducing competition. It cann~t 
be, as the state is supposed not to discriminate between firms that are legally established. Since 1927 it 
is legally required to give out all work in public tender. Where tendering is done selectively it is usually 
on an ad hoe basis. There is no formal classification system of firms into market segments by size. 
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The German case is located at the other extreme. Selective tendering is now only used incidentally by 
local authorities and Under as the Federal Government and most Under do no longer give money to 
local projeas uni~ there is open competition. This reflects the importance of legalism in German legal 
and administrative culture, as compared to informalism in Britain. 
Thus the order of countries in the use of selective tendering is opposite to that of the one in state 
regulated market entry. In the latter Germany scores the highest and the UK the lowesL In selective 
tendering the situation is just the opposite. In both rank orders of market regulation the Netherlands 
occupies an intermediate position. 
4.2.3. Regulation or the Contract Specifications 
The uniqueness of the product, the separation of design and construction, and the practice of tendering 
pose specific problems to a contractor. He has to commit himself to a price, but given the uniqueness 
of the product - and the intransparancy of the market - he cannot orient himself to an average market-
price level. Instead, he has to base his price on a cost-calculation, which has to be made anew for every 
project. A reliable calculation requires exact data regarding amounts, prices and quality of labour, 
machinery and building materials as well as production time needed. 
A frequent complaint is that the specifications from the principal do not provide adequate enough 
information. Also, the design may contain elements which pose difficulties in construction. This could lead 
to considerable differences in calculations and prices of the various competitors and the lowest calculated 
price - often the one that gets the job - may well be below the real costprice level. Furthermore, although 
in many countries formally the principal is responsible for vagueness in the specifications, in practice it 
is the contractor who has to stand the racket. He has committed himself to do the job for the price 
offered. This implies that he runs a considerable risk in the information transfer and in miscalculation, 
a factor which adds to the fierceness of competition. 
This problem has been tackled in different ways in various countries. In Britain (and France) a special 
profession has been created to reduce the problem. So called quantity surveyors assist the principal and 
the architect in calculating standardized quantities of building materials required. They produce a Bill of 
Quantities, included in the contract, so that it is the principal, who is clearly responsible for understate-
ments of quantities. 
In other countries, business interest associations have found an important task in attempting to reduce 
this risk. First of all, they have pressed for the development by others, especially the state, of model 
contracts and model specifications, of prescribed uniform criteria for description and drawing of the work, 
of detailed and standardized indications of the quantities of building materials to be used, and of standard 
administrative conditions and payment schemes. Secondly, they have developed such models and standards 
themselves and tried to get them widely accepted and uniformly applied by clients. 
Dutch business interest associations in construction have done both. Standardized model contracts and 
specifications have been important topics for consultation with the government and other important 
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clients. These talks have produced several foundations, jointly governed by construction associations, 
architects and the state, which develop standard specifications, standard quantity tables, etc. Thus far 
however, their guidelines and models have not been imposed on the industry. They can only be applied 
voluntarily by clients and contractors. More successful have they been in their attempts to get uniform 
administrative rontract conditions - such as payment schemes, discounts, premiums, fines for overtime 
delivery, bank guarantees required from the contractor, etc. - generally accepted. 
In addition, much effort has been invested in the development of standard quality criteria for building 
materials. To this end Dutch interest associations have created a private quality standardization agency 
for construction, KOMO, officially recognized and sanctioned by the state. In Germany, such standards 
for building materials are developed by the general ager.cy for standardization DIN, which has a large 
bureaucracy exclusively for construction. 
4.2.4. Education and Information Exchange 
BIAs have also involved themselves in educating contractors in costprice calculation, in order to reduce 
the chance that anyone may submit below-cost price bids for reasons of ignorance. Thus they provide 
information and advice to their members, both on collective and individual basis. In this context some 
also have developed standardized tariffs for materials and processes, published in special books, which 
they advice their members to use. 
Swiss associations probably do most in informing members on work specifications and bids, as they 
supplement general information with information, specific to a construction project. The Swiss SBV has 
in 1968 promulgated a set of competition rules which compel its members to report any intended 
participation in tender and to take part in meetings of all tenderers where technical questions regarding 
the work are discussed, where the specifications are collectively interpreted and evaluated, and where 
suggestions for various calculation bases are considered and eventually agreed upon. The meetings are 
called for works of a certain mimimum size and whenever at least one tenderer asks for it. Consultation 
on prices is officially not allowed. Each contractor is free to determine his price bid at any time. 
However, the participants may agree on binding standard rates for certain materials or specific labour 
costs such as shift-labour. After the meetings, the chairmen consult/negotiate on behalf of the tenderers 
with the principal to further analyse the specifications and to clarify any vague points. The purpose of 
this arrangement is to reduce differences in interpretation of data and hence in price calculations. The 
meetings also have an educational function. They confront contractors again and again with the necessity 
to calculate seriously. The rules are backed by sanctions varying from admonitions to fines to expulsion. 
However, as Kriesi and Schaller (1984) write, they have sometimes been difficult to apply, especially 
during recessions in construction. 
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4.2.S. Escalator Contract-Clauses 
Another way to reduce risk is to get the principal to accept so-called escalator clauses in contracts, 
which enable the contractor to pass on unforeseen cost increases due to strikes, new collective wage 
contracts or higher prices of building materials during the term of the job to the principal. 
Dutch BIAs succeeded, after years of pressuring, to get such clauses introduced in standard contracts. 
Joint committees of contractors associations and representatives of large customers decide now which cost 
increases are eligible for transfer to the principal. They publish regularly adapted standard wages and 
prices of materials. 
These escalator clauses have further divided large and small firms in the Netherlands. As they regard 
the 'unforeseen future', such clauses are generally only present in long-term contracts, that is, for building 
work done by the larger firms. The latter came thus to dispose over escapes, which the smaller firms do 
not have. As a result, larger firms have tended to oppose wage increases and strikes less fiercely than 
their smaller colleagues, the more so as the larger firms are first and foremost hit by strikes. This has 
aggravated interest conflicts between large and small firms and led to the recent formation of separate 
associations for both categories of firms. 
German construction law also contains escalator clauses and they are frequently applied. Unlike in The 
Netherlands however they may apply to all contracts and all firms and hence rather than being a source 
of division between large and small firms they provide a base for common interests. 
4.2.6. Arbitration 
Furthermore, interest associations of construction have pressed for a more equitable distribution of risks 
between customer and contractor. Originally, disputes over interpretations of the contract were usually 
unilaterally decided by the most powerful contract partner, the principal. Therefore, contractors 
associations have lobbied for the introduction of neutral arbitration in the case of commercial conflicts 
between a principal and his contractor. This was for exampl.J;! the major aim of the first national Dutch 
BIA in construction, the 'Nederlandse Aannemers Bond' (NAB), established in 1895. Only after years of 
lobbying did it succeed in establishing, jointly with associations of architects, a General Council for 
Arbitration for Construction Firms, made up of former prominent engineers, architects, contractors and 
civil servants from building departments. At first, referral to such arbitration in contracts was voluntary. 
The associations of contractors, architects and engineers could do no more than advise their members 
to accept it. Only after a boycot, organized by the association of contractors, did arbitration came to be 
generally accepted by private customers. It took however another 16 years of political lobbying before the 
state too accepted arbitration and included it in its own model administrative conditions. 
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4.2.7. Construction Cartels: Pre-Tender Consultations over Price Bids 
Still another way to mitigate fierce competition is through exchange of price information and price 
agreements by contractors, prior to submitting bids to the principal. In this respect too there are 
significant differences between countries, which have to do with the legality of such cartel-like arrange-
ments. In most countries pre-tender price consultation is forbidden. One of the few countries where this 
is not so is the Netherlands. Here formal price cartels, condoned by the state, exist. Where it is forbidden, 
contractors have to resort to alternatives. In Britain price information is formally exchanged after the 
tender is over, as a kind of market orientation for the contractors. In addition, in most countries infor-
mal agreements take the place of formal ones. These are more vigorously contested by the authorities 
in one country than in another. Thus it seems that the German 'Bundeskartellamt' hits harder on cartels 
than e.g. the Swiss authorities do. Thus one could form a rank order of countries by formalization and 
frequency of price consultation. This would have Germany at the one extreme (little (formal) price 
consultation) and the Netherlands at the other. The UK and Switzerland fit in between, Switzerland a 
bit more to the Dutch side. Because of the peculiarity of the Dutch arrangement, this will be discussed 
first. 
Any Dutch contractor, which is a member of an interest association, is bound by the 'Code of Honour 
of Building Contractors', which requires him to report any intended bid to a so-called 'price regulating 
organization' (PRO), a special association of which he also can become a member. If its registration office 
signals that other contractors too have been invited for the same work, the PRO calls a meeting of all 
prospective tenderers. Firms which are member of a PRO are also obliged to participate in these 
meetings. They are comparable to the ones the Swiss SBV organizes, and discussed earlier on. Instead 
of the specifications however, the prices form the topic of consultation. All tenderers present hand in 
their price bid in a closed enveloppe to the chairman, who opens the enveloppes and informs those 
present of everyone's price. Then it is known who is likely to get the job, as it is custom at tenders that 
it will be the one with the lowest bid. After the prices have been 'opened' all participants are committed 
to their price. This is the one they have to submit to the principal. They are not allowed to lower it 
subsequently, even after a longer period of time. This weak form of cartellization has been created to 
prevent principals from playing off contractors against one another. The state has condoned this practice, 
because it shares the view of the contractors that they are posited on the weak side of an unequal market 
relationship. 
The price-regulating scheme has some other objectives as well. Those present at the meeting can decide 
(only unanimously), before the prices are 'opened', to raise all their prices, including those of the lowest, 
with a percentage out of which the calculation efforts of all present will be compensated. Furthermore, 
the meeting can - again only unanimously - decide to allocate the job to a specific participant if he 
requests so before the enveloppes are opened. He may want the job badly or might already have a job 
on the same location. Giving him 'preference' prevents him from spoiling the price level with a very low 
bid. The one given 'preference' is allowed to submit a price below that of all others. 
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The exchange or price information has a Jong history. Before the last World War it was done informally 
through the mediation or a local confidential agent, such as a pub owner. Two factors were responsible 
for formalization. First or all, these then secret practices came increasingly under attack from principals 
and the public. In attempt to increase their legitimacy, contractors decided to shed them from their 
secrecy, by establishing formal rules and formal control agencies. Secondly, it happened more and more 
that two or more separate meetings took place over the same job. The local confidential agents made 
good money with their coordinating work and expanded operations. This led to competition between 
different ones and that made price fixing Jess effective. Therefore, the industry decided in the early fifties 
to shove the commercial mediators aside and to create a number of PROs with a monopoly in a certain 
region and/or subsector. This formal scheme has made the cartel-agreements accessible to public scrutiny 
and control, an undeniable advantage. This advantage is at present threatened, as the EC has taken this 
relatively visible cartel as an easy target for its cartel-fighting program. Recently, the European Court 
if Justice has declared the Dutch construction cartel illegal and imposed fines numbering in the millions 
of ECU on the involved associations. At present, appeal procedures are pending. 
The formal price fixing system is of course often backed up by informal collusion, and for this the 
regional general trade associations function as important channel. Their social meetings are occasions 
where contractors 'over a drink' discuss and negotiate informal agreements on production costs, prices 
and preferences of contractors for specific work. At these informal pre-pre-tender meetings the stage is 
often set for what happens at the official price exchanges. 
The formal price regulating scheme contributes also in another, unintended way to a reduction of 
competition. A consequence of the scheme is that it invites for 'tender tourism'. Once in a while contrac-
tors participate in tenders, just to pocket the compensation money for calculations which they do not 
seriously make. This danger is especially present at public tenders. Here sometimes larger numbers of 
contractors submit prices than would have been the case without the price regulating scheme. This raises 
the costs for the principal, who bas to pay more calculation compensations. Thus public tenders become 
counterproductive for the principal. Rather than forcing the price down they raise it. As a reaction, 
principals have increasingly chosen for selective tender rather than public tender and with less competitors 
there is often less competition. 
The Swiss SBV performs only some functions similar to the Dutch PROs. As mentioned, members are 
compelled to report participation in tenders. After that the SBV may organize meetings of the bidders. 
Although prices are officially not discussed, the meetings facilitate of course informal price agreements, 
as bidders get to know their competitors for the specific job. Such agreements are not made within the 
SBV but through special 'clubs', informal groupings of firms, which allocate by gentleman's agreements 
the different projects among their members. There are several of these clubs known, e.g. the 'Berner Club' 
for civil engineering and the 'Zurcher Club' for drilling. These informal cartels are very fragile. 
Participation is voluntary and there are no effective sanctions (Kriesi and Schaller 1984). The SBV 
performs still another function regarding prices. The reports of the members to the SBV regarding 
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participation should include their price bids. These prices are made known to all participants, but without 
the names of the bidders. In this way the competitors gain some insight in the markeL 
Something similar is found in Britain. There so called local 'Builders Conferences' exist, which require 
their members to report bids to any tender with a value over £.6.000,- to the secretary of the conference. 
· However, unlike in Switzerland and the Netherlands, this information cannot be used to call pre-tender 
meetings nor can it be distributed before closing of the tender. The price information is circulated to the 
members 24 hours after the time for submission of bids is over. The goal is the same as in Switzerland: 
to give contractors information on the average price level and on the utilization of the capacity of 
competitors. Formerly, some Builders Conferences have been involved in informal agreements distributing 
work over contractors through the practice of 'cover pricing', similar to what happens in Switzerland in-
formally and in the Netherlands officially. However, these practices were investigated by the Monopolies 
Commission in 1954 and were ruled to be illegal. Since then, the Builders Conferences do not seem to 
involve themselves in such agreements any more. 
Even these weaker forms of formal exchange of price information found in Switzerland and Britain are 
not available to German contractors. All such forms have become illegal under the new German Kar-
tellrecht from 1957. A post-tender price monitoring arrangement as in Britain has been operated by 
regional business associations in Germany, but in 1973 that too was declared illegal by the German 
Bundeskartellamt, because it should have provided firms with a means to identify their competitors, so 
that they could approach each other for informal price agreements. The pressures of competition however 
have been so strong that as an alternative for formal and controlled price regulation firms have resorted 
to large-scale illegal collusion and price fixing, notwithstanding regular agressive and spectacular razzias 
of the law enforcement agencies and extremely heavy fines. In 1975 336 German contractors were fined 
for 36 million Marks in total and in 1983 77 building firms for the huge sum of 54 million Marks for 
unlawful price agreements between 1977 and 1980. Fifteen firms had to pay each more than a million 
Marks. This was the largest economic scandal in the history of the BRD. It turned out that these infor-
mal agreements were especially extensive in civil engineering. It was said that no tenders for water- and 
tunnelworks between Ost-Friesland and the Alps took place without informal price agreements. A number 
of them were made by the way in the much more cartel-friendly atmosphere of the Netherlands. 
Contractors have thus found various ways to compensate for the market asymmetries in construction. 
Unlike with market-entry regulations these have usually been the work of private agencies, varying from 
formal interest associations, like the Dutch PROs, over the semi-formal Swiss clubs and British Builders 
Conferences to informal and temporary collusion as in Germany. The role of the state has been more 
passive and/or negative in this area: from condoning to formally forbidding to actively fighting such forms 
of collective action and self-regulation. 
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4.3. The Problem of Provision or Collective Goods: Vocational Training 
Given the structure of the industry, the problems with the provision of collective goods, such as 
vocational training, are quite severe. The fierce competition makes it especially tempting for employers 
to free ride on the investments in skilled workers of their competitors; the need for broad qualifications, 
given the prevailing technology of flexible specialization, that is the difficulties of investing in firm-specific 
qualifications, makes it relatively easy to buy away workers from competitors; and the relative high 
mobility of workers facilitates this even more. Construction firms do not usually have their 'own' workers: 
they call upon a collective pool of skilled labour, to be used by all, depending on their specific and 
temporary needs. For these reasons, it does not pay for individual building entrepreneurs to invest in 
training. Only a collective actor, who can overcome free rider problems, can provide such collective goods. 
Such an actor could be the state, employers' associations or trade unions. The involvement of these actors 
differs however quite significantly between countries. 
France stands for the typical ~tatist form. Here the state plays by far the most important role in the 
provision of vocational training. The role of interest associations is a rather minor one. Basic vocational 
training is rendered by public educational institutions (Crouch 1991). There is a first level for 13-16 year-
olds, which leads to the Certificat d'Aptitude Professionelle (CAP) and with which one becomes a skilled 
worker. A second level for 15-18 year olds (after compulsory education) trains for the technical 
baccalaureat, a CAP, or a Brevet d'Etudes Professionelles (BEP). The involvement of employers' 
associations does not go further than a minor advisory role in the curriculum for this basic vocational 
training (Lane 1989: 69). Although some continued vocational training is provided by firms, this happens 
only under compulsion by the state. The latter introduced in 1971 a law, without consultation of the 
social partners, under which all businessmen become obliged to spend at least 1,1 percent of their total 
wages on training. They could either provide such training themselves or pay a certain amount in a state 
fund for training. Thus free ridership was to become difficult (Madigan 1990: 32). 
Germany represents the ideal-typical corporatist model: state and associations of employers and 
employees are jointly responsible for basic vocational training for 15-18 year-olds. It is a 'dual system': 
practical training on the job suppplemented by theoretical education in separate schools, for which. 
employers have to give their trainees leave of absence. The great majority of youngsters enters after 
compulsory education into a training-contract with a company. All participating firms are required to 
employ workers, capable of training the pupils on the job. Interest associations are in various ways 
involved in the system. First of all, they cooperate closely with the Bundesinstitut fiir Berufsbildung in 
the determination of the training-content for about 380 recognized trades. Secondly, the Handwerkskam-
mem and the Industry- and Handelskammem, on whose boards they are represented, register the training-
contracts between firms and pupils, supervise the various training facilities, and are responsible for the 
administration of the exams. Thirdly, employers' associations and trade unions exert pressure - directly 
and through the Chambers - on firms which resist cooperation. Firms which buy away freshly trained 
workers from their competitors are publicly chastised. Fourthly, the associations determine in the 
l 
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collective wage negotiations the wages of trainees and try to ensure that these will remain low enough 
to keep it profitable for businessmen to employ trainees. The state contribution consists of legal back-
up of these arrangements, making them compulsory. Thus firms are legally obliged to joint a Handwerks-
kammer. The latter have been given duties, rights and resources under public law. Free rider behaviour 
is discouraged by forbidding firms to hire youngsters under 18 without offering them a training contract. 
Furthermore, the state - in casu de Under - pay for the school training (Streeck 1987). The Dutch, 
Austrian and Swiss systems are somewhat similar to the German model. In the Netherlands, which lacks 
the German Handwerkrecht, there is no statutory compulsion to participate. Hence the scheme is much 
less effective, as data on the number of apprentices per worker, presented in chapter 3 (table llb) show. 
In Britain, state involvement in vocational training is the least, but here neither the associations of 
employers and employees do much about iL The British rely more on the allocation- and coordination 
principle of the market than on that of the state or associations in providing vocational training. Until 
the end of the 1960s Britain still had a system somewhat comparable to the German one. There were 
statutory Industry Training Boards, on which employers' associations and trade unions were represented. 
They operated various training facilities combining practical training on the job with theoretical 
instruction in school. The system was financed by a legally compulsory levy among business. It broke 
down however as, under pressure of various recessions, less and less entrepreneurs were willing to employ 
trainees. Their interest association lacked sufficient authority to force them to do so. Furthermore, various 
policy conflicts emerged between the organii.ations and the Thatcher government, which wanted more 
'market' and eventually got iL Now regional Training en Enterprise Councils have been created, manned 
no longer by interest representatives but by leading entrepreneurs a titre personel. The Councils have to 
acquire their financial resources largely out of voluntary contributions by business, and in this the interest 
associations can be of little help. Contracts for courses are tendered on a market model to among others 
commercial training institutes. The role of the government goes no further than formation of TEC's. The 
government does not by itself provide vocational training and neither does it force entrepreneurs to do 
so or to participate in any training facilities. It only subsidizes TEC's for their effort in rescholing 
unemployed. Vocational training is hence left here largely to individual initiatives of firms. These are 
however hardly inclined to invest in general vocational training, given the high mobility of workers. 
The Swedish and Italian systems for vocational training take up an intermediary position in between 
the French and German models. At first sight the Swedish model looks like the French. Basic vocational 
training is provided by public educational institutions. However, employers' associations and trade unions 
play a major role in general in the Swedish administration and hence also in public education. Thus 
there is a tripartite Labour Market Council which gathers information concerning training needs of 
business and which supervises the educational institutions. The national Italian model seems also similar 
to the French: training by the state. However, in various regions there are joint committees of local 
government, local political parties, and local chapters trade unions and employers' associations for 
stimulating regional industry. They have created new forms of training under joint responsibility of firms 
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and regional government. especially for small and medium sized business, which has most problems with 
providing a skilled workforce. 
4.4. Overall Governance of the Sector and Country-Differentiation 
There is a great need for regulation in the construction industry. The nature of the product and the 
structure of the industry are such that serious problems emerge and persist in the absence of governance 
arrangements: fierce and destructive competition, periodic unemployment and other instabilities on the 
labour market, lack of infrastructure such as vocational training and research and development, frequent 
bancruptcies, poor building quality, health and safety problems, dangers to the environment, etc. Almost 
all those involved suffer in one way or another from such problems - contractors, subcontractors, workers, 
principals, customers, users of buildings, and the general public. 
Given the small size and limited resources of the average firm in construction, any governance cannot 
be achieved through interventions of individual large firms, that is, through the ~rinciple of 'hierarchical 
organization'. Instead, the sector is dependent on 'horizontal organization', in other words, on collective 
regulation through interest associations in which business cooperates voluntarily. 
There are however also significant problems for self-regulation by interest associations. Firstly, the 
various cleavages in the industry - between large and small firms, between contractors and subcontractors, 
between building and civil engineering, between the main sector and the finishing trades, between 
contractors and speculative builders or developers, between contractors of different religious or ideological 
conviction, between various regions - have divided the industry and induced it to organize in a large 
number of different trade associations and employers' associations. This fragmentation of the associatio-
nal system, which is probably in no other industry as great as in construction (Van Waarden 1992b), has 
either made it difficult for the industry to agree on regulatory measures, or has reduced the effectiveness 
of any form of self-regulation. 
Secondly, the integration of the construction industry in larger, more comprehensive peak associations 
is problematic because of the conflicting interests between construction and most other industries. 
Whereas other industries had an interest in tax reductions and state budget cuts, the construction industry 
lives of public expenditures; and whereas the construction industry is dependent on domestic demand 
and hence on high wage levels, most other industries export a significant part of their products and hence 
have a greater interest in low wages. This division of business has reduced the overall influence of the 
sector. 
Thirdly, the structure of the industry is such that it guarantees significant problems to any attempted 
collective action by individual associations: large number of firms, high turnover, fierce competition, broad 
competition given the limited degree of market segmentation, etc. The temptation for an individual firm 
to 'free ride' on the restraint and offers of their competitors is hence especially great in this industry, and 
increases the fear of everyone to become a 'sucker', in the terminology of game-theory. This hinders not 
59 
only the effective functioning of interest associations, but frustrates also collective self-regulation. Any 
attempts made in the past have indeed not been without difficulties. 
Hence the sector already at an early date realized the neces.sity of external suppon for self-regulation. 
This has been sought either in the form of closed shop or exclusive trade agreements with trade unions 
or associations of suppliers; or in the form of state assistance, e.g. public sanctions against free riders, 
other statutory supports for private associations, generally-binding declaration of private regulations, or 
even the replacement of private regulation by public law. 
Such help from state agencies has indeed been forthcoming. First of all, because of the importance of 
the industry for socio-economic goals of the government, such as employment and economic growth. 
Secondly, the state itself has an interest in an ordered market in construction as it is a major customer 
of the industry given its responsibility for the physical infrastructure of the nation. Thirdly, the state 
also has an interest in regulation because of its responsibility for safety of the population, both on the 
street and in their houses and offices. 
These problems and interests have produced a great number of regulations given out by a large variety 
of state and semi-state agencies. There is perhaps no other sector in which so many and so complicated 
structured quangos exist and in which such an assortment of state agencies and private organizations 
cooperate: central building ministries, the departments of labour, finance, trade and the interior, local 
government authorities (usually resonsible for local building codes), interest associations of contractors 
and suppliers, trade unions, professional associations of architects and engineers, etc. Originally, many 
regulations were issued by building contracting agencies as well as local authorities responsible for public 
safety. In time, as regional markets became less closed-off and the need for harmonization and 
equalization increased, other central government agencies got involved, up to, most recently, also 
supranational actors such as the EC with its directives for tendering in construction. 
Nevertheless, there are still sizeable differences in governance arrangements between countries - and 
sometimes even between regions. It is difficult to rank-order countries by the degree of regulation of 
construction. There are a great number of subjects that can be and are regulated, and the forms in which 
this is done, e.g. which actors are responsible, varies also quite a bit. However, as regards the public-
private mix of agencies involved, one could say that the least government involvement is found in Britain, 
the most in France. Germany, Austria and the Netherlands take up intermediary positions as regards state 
involvement. Here interest associations play a larger role, but usually either under the passive protection 
or the active support of the government. In Germany the state is more actively involved in associational 
arrangements, either positively or negatively. There are binding regulations supporting self-regulation of 
market entry and vocational training, the Handwerksrecht. On the other hand, cartels to mitigate 
competition are actively fought by the state. The Dutch government assumes a more passive supporting 
role. There is less compulsion or less detailed regulation of market entry and vocational training. On the 
other hand, the state condones price regulating arrangements of the industry. 
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4.5. Governance and Economic Performance 
A comparison of this rough categorization of countries by sector-governance with the performance 
scores presented in chapter 3 shows that some of the overall best performing national construction sectors 
(see table 14: Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland) are those that have extensive sectoral governance 
arrangements which involve close cooperation between business' associations and the state. They score 
especially high on criteria of equity, dynamic efficiency and stability (on the latter also the other 
corporatist countries Sweden and Austria) but low on static efficiency. This supports our argument that 
collective governance arrangements are needed to reduce the extremely intense problems of uncertainty 
(fierce competition) and variability. Only under such conditions can construction plan and invest for the 
future and keep up high productivity, and are workers ensured of decent wages and working conditions, 
without however exploiting consumers with high housing prices. Hence these are the countries that are 
capable of combining long-term economic efficiency with equity, or, in the terms of the FINE-project, 
external competitiveness with internal cohesion. 
By contrast, a country with a liberal governance regime, with much less collective regulation of the 
market, Britain, scores high on static efficiency, but low on equity and stability. It may have an efficient 
industry, at least on short-term criteria, but it cannot combine this with internal cohesion. Not only 
workers, but also consumers suffer. 
Thirdly, countries which have at least some forms of regulation and collective provision of public goods 
in construction, but in which the state tends to play a larger role, France, Italy and Spain, score in 
between on the various performance criteria, somewhat higher on static efficiency, and lower on dynamic 
efficiency, equity, and stability. In that sense they are closer to the British than to the German-Dutch 
model of performance. With Britain they are low cost, low price, low productivity sectors. 
A curious exception is Austria, traditionally considered extremely corporatist in the literature. It scores 
at the very bottom of the performance rank-order. Perhaps corporatism is so strongly developed here, that 
it becomes a form a monopolistic closure, which might be effective in protecting the short-term interests 
of business and workers, but which externalizes costs too much to consumers (high prices and age, and 
short supply of housing) and/or reduces competition to such a degree that the 'bad' consequences of 
'distributional coalitions', as predicted by economists (e.g. Olson 1982), lethargy, low growth, low 
investment, etc. do indeed surface. By contrast, corporatist governance arrangements in Germany, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland seem to be less restrictive and leave room for sufficient competition to 
prevent such consequences. 
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5. CHANGE FACTORS, and their consequences for construction 
5.1. Demographk Trends 
There will be a growth in population. Forecasts for the year 2000 predict an increase in population in 
the EC-12 of 6 million people (from 1988: 324.81 millions to 2000: 331.17 millions). Nevertheless, 
European countries are affected differently. D, UK. CH and S will experience a decline, while all other 
countries either stagnate (DK) or increase in population (see Czerny 1990:79). A longer term forecast 
for 2025 shows an increase of the whole European population by 15 million people (from 1990: 497.74 
to 2025: 512.29). Especially Southern and Eastern Europe will increase in population while Western 
Europe will experience decline (from 155,8 to 152,9) (Demographische lnformationen 90/CJl). For the 
construction industry this means a general increase in future demand. 
The age of the population will increase. In Austria e.g. half of the population will be older than 50 years 
in 2015 (see Czerny 1990:83). This greying of the population means an increased need for small housing 
units and could also imply changes in urban planning, leading to more densely concentrated neighbor-
hoods, since older people, being less mobile, may want to live closer to shops and services. Increased 
aging of popolution also means a tendency towards higher Labor costs since the working population has 
to finance the non-working part. This affects all sectors but construction in particular, since labour is such 
an important input factor here. 
The general level of education of the population is also likely to increase, thus enlarging also the supply 
of qualified labour for industry. However, for construction it could also bring future problems in 
recruiting apprentices for vocational training programs - and hence a stable long-term supply of qualified 
labour - especially in those countries where the status of manual work is not kept up by arrangements 
such as the German Handwerkrecht and the protection it affords. A possible shortage of qualified labour 
might compel the industry to offer higher wages or to attempt to replace labour by capital goods. 
On the other hand, the expected migrations from the South and East to the EC are likely to increase 
the supply of unskilled workers. For the construction industry, this could also bring an increase in the use 
of black labour since the incentives to hire unqualified black labour are high in this sector. Furthermore, 
the increase of unskilled labour supply and of increased black labour may put downward pressure on 
wages for the unskilled, an effect that most probably will dominate the tendency for higher wages to 
finance a larger inactive population because of aging. The increased competition on the market for 
unskilled labour and the frequency of black labour could also weaken trade unions in this market segment 
and lower the quality of the working place (less security measures etc.) This, coupled with a possible greater 
shortage of skilled labour, could produce a sharper segmentation of the labour market in construction. 
This tendency may especially be felt in those countries at the borders of cheap labour countries 
(Germany, Austria, Italy). In these countries, cross-border commuting labour is likely to increase. The 
counter-side of the coin is that business in these countries will have a comparative advantage over other 
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oountries in the form of cheap labour. Finally, it may be mentioned that migration will also increases the 
demand for cheap housing. This oould mean more housing demand, but it oould also form a market for 
old derelict housing in the inner cities, thus reducing the pressure for - or even increasing the opposition 
to - housing renovation. 
From demographic trends we can, therefore, expect: 
- Changes in demand: higher general demand for construction, more demand for cheap housing and for 
smaller housing units, and more in ooncentrated form, e.g. in inner cities; 
- Changes in the labour market: a stronger segmentation of the market, with lower wages, increased black 
labour and Jess safe working places in the market segment for unskilled labour, and possible labour 
shortages, higher wages and replacement of labour by capital in the skilled segment. 
- Changes in housing prices: the greater demand due to population growth, migration and further 
individualization of living arrangements may boost housing prices especially in areas where possibilities 
for additional construction are limited (cities); migrant and black labour could however reduce costs 
somewhat. However, as argued in chapter one, housing prices hardly reflect construction costs. Land 
prices and interest rates tend to be more important. 
5.2. Cultural Trends 
Further individualization in society will imply continued individualization of living a"angements. This 
will produce an increased demand for small dwellings for single people, from schoolleavers to the single-
old-aged. Increased individualization may also modify and diversify housing tastes, thus requiring more 
specialization and more variations in housing supply and possibly inhibiting the use of standardiz.ed 
industrial building methods as there will be less demand for standardized housing. Tastes may also vary 
and shift more quickly than in former times. Hence demand may become less stable and less predictable, 
more volatile. This will concern especially the quality of housing demand. The future quantity in demand 
may be relatively easier to predict. In construction, especially speculative contractors, who build houses 
on their own risk to sell afterwards, will be affected. In short, the problems of variability and uncertainty, 
typical for the construction industry, will most likely only increase as result of shifts in cultural values 
and living arrangements. 
Cultural values have already introduced environmental criteria in construction, and this trend is likely 
to continue. Consumers will demand bio-houses, built with other building materials, tested for chemical 
safety, preference for recycled materials, perhaps more natural building materials at least if these can be 
supplied in large quantities without harming the natural environment (shortage of tropical wood, durable 
redwood). The demand for energy saving will require better insulation and newer materials which insulate 
but do not inhibit the circulation and refreshment of air, as the air quality inside houses is often much 
worse than that outside, even in areas with smokestack industries. 
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5.3. Economic Trends 
Growth ra1es and household incomes will increase less rapid than in the last decades if inequalities 
between continents are not reduced. Only improved income of the Third World would guarantee new 
large markets to be explored and, therefore, long-term growth perspectives. Also unonpw:;ment has 
become often structural and is likely to remain at a relatively high level, thus making planning of future 
income more difficult for workers. With moderate increases in income and employment uncertainty, 
workers may be hesitant to buy houses. Nevertheless, as long as long-term growth rates are positive (a 
necessary condition for a capitalist economy to survive), there will be an increase in welfare and thus also 
in spending for housing. 
The future development of financial markets is not favorable for construction. The growing 
international interdependence of financial transactions leads to greater volatility in supply and demand 
of capital and to increased speculation. This makes (real) interest rates excessively volatile and high 
(Gretschmann 1992) and produces more uncertainty for construction, a sector which is more than many 
others highly dependent on interest rates. As has been argued, interest rates do not only influence 
investment decisions of their business clientele (costs of loans and opportunity costs of investment) but 
also housing decisions of households (costs of housing loans). Long-term decisions that can be postponed, 
such as those for better housing, are more sensitive to interest rates. Hence construction will, in the long 
run, be confronted with business investments that become more insecure and volatile, mortgages that get 
more expensive, and hence housing costs that become more difficult to calculate. The overall effect could 
be a dampening and greater instability of demand for housing. 
The greater uncertainty which can be expected as a result of more volatile and individualized demand 
and instability of interest rates would give the public sector an important role in dampening volatility 
through stable and/or counter-cyclical public demand for construction. It should play a buffer role when 
private demand withholds. Many states have done so in the past, especially in the 'stabilizing' countries 
(chapter 3). However, as the need increases, the possibilities decline. Budget deficits have become so high 
in many countries that a prime policy objective for the foreseeable future will be the reduction of the 
deficit. This means that a powerful demand component will be less present in the future or will be less 
susceptible to manipulation. Budget consolidating programs will also frustrate indirect strategies for pubic 
management of construction demand, e.g. through subsidy-programs for housing or for interest rates on 
housing. Nevertheless, the state will remain an important client of the construction industry, since -
according to Wagner's law of the 1860s - societies with increased welfare levels have a greater need for 
public goods. A growing market economy requires ever more public goods such as roads, airports, 
railroads, telecommunication networks, hospitals, schools etc., but cannot provide them by itself. 
The internationalization and globalization of markets, the increased speed with which the production 
factors financial capital, real capital and labour can cross borders, the EC-integration, the enlargement 
of markets will have less direct effect on the construction industry than on other sectors. Since construction 
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is tied to the location of consumption and hence produces primarily for the domestic or even local 
market {the expon share is increasing but still not more than ten percent), it will be less affected by 
international economic change. Internationalization will mainly exert indirect influence, e.g. through the 
volatility of interest rates and the availability of black labour, which have already been mentioned as 
future important trends. A direct effect would be increased competition from foreign firms. However, this 
will remain limited in comparison with other sectors and restricted to some special branches, like tunnel 
building or very large construction projects. The majority of construction work, which is highly dependent 
on local environmental, taste, and know how conditions, will not be much affected. Construction will 
remain rather sheltered from international economic developments. This means that the positive economic 
effects expected from EC-integration - namely economies-of-scale in larger markets - will not apply to 
the construction industry either. The main economic effects will be effects on the labour market. Bigger 
changes are to be expected from political integration {see further). 
Land could become more scarce in the face of a growing population. This will increase land prices and 
make it more volatile to speculation. Housing prices to the consumer would increase and that might affect 
the demand for construction products negatively. Alternatively, different and perhaps more expensive 
building designs and building methods might become more in demand (e.g. vertical rather than horizontal 
building). Countertrends on land prices, however, will be that land from agricultural overproduction will 
become available for other purposes and that the European population growth rates are only modesL 
The long-term trend of any capitalist society will be higher productivity and income and shorter working 
time. There is no reason to expect that this secular trend from the past - see e.g. the historical reduction 
of working time from 18 to 8 hours a day - will not be continue in the future. This makes leisure time 
in the future more important for construction. It will bring greater demand for second homes, for 
modernization and renovation, for hotels, amusement parks etc. Ever higher income of a richer society will 
also affect the demand for housing: better quality, larger size, more individualistic design. 
The prosperity will however continue to attract migrants from poorer countries, who will find their way 
into European societies, whether legal or illegal. This will have effects both on the labour market and 
on the product markets for construction. The abuse of black labour by business and further segmentation 
of the labour market will enhance income inequality in societies of otherwise growing prosperity. That 
will also produce a segmentation of the demand for housing. The poor will need cheap and small housing 
units. In the absence of a welfare state housing policy, this would even mean that they have an interest 
in the preservation of unrenovated old houses, hence an interest in no construction activity. The rich on 
the other hand will generate a demand for high quality, individualized and large-sized houses. 
To sum up, economic trends will bring increased chances for abuse of black labour, segmentation of 
labour markets, little dependence on international developments except for interest rates, a moderate 
increase in overall demand for housing, but less public demand and more volatility and diversity in 
demand, that is, a division between a market for new, large and high-quality housing and a market for 
old, small and cheap housing. In short, construction is likely to be faced with even greater problems of 
variability and uncertainty on its markets in the future. 
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5.4. Technologkal Trends 
Several problems of variability and uncenainty could perhaps be countered by present and future 
technological and organizational innovations. 
New product technology could for example help to satisfy the greater demand for individualized or more 
environmentally friendly buildings. The computer-age, although slow in coming, has also made some 
inroads in construction. Electronics and information technology is increasingly being used in central 
heating systems to help save energy costs and - in large office buildings - to save on maintenance work. 
and to help managers monitor costs and apponion service charges to renters more efficiently. New 
building materials and 'compact construction' building styles are also applied to reduce energy costs. In 
road building, new materials for roadbeds help stabilize roads over time and thus to reduce maintenance 
costs, and 'open asphalt' reduces traffic noise and increases driving safety during wet weather. However, 
most product innovations do not emanate from the construction industry, but from the architects, 
engineers and building materials industry. Closer cooperation between design and production phases (see 
under 'Organiz.ation of Work') could however involve construction more in product innovations. 
The construction industry itself has greater influence in the development and application of process 
technology. Pre-fabrication of housing could become more widespread, also outside countries where it has 
developed most strongly sofar (NL, GB, F) and could also be applied to other materials than concrete, 
aluminum and wood. The industry will continue to try to use more economies-of-scale and industrial 
building methods, through standardization of design and of materials and building segments. However, 
such possibilities will in the end always remain restricted by the uniqueness of the product and of the 
conditions under which one has to build. Such problems will even be enhanced by the trends towards 
individualiz.ation in living arrangements, etc. 
While pre-fabrication can only be appplied in mass production, the computer offers possibililities to 
respond to the demands for and problems posed by variability, specific to construction. Computer aided 
design systems bridge standardization and individualization of design and are cenain to become frequently 
used. Another multi-purpose machine, possibly useful in construction, is the robot. Many of the larger 
multinational construction companies are already experimenting with them on building sites, not only to 
.reduce labour costs, but also to increase safety at the workplace. Thus robots have been applied in the 
relatively dangerous sector of tunnel-construction. It is however to be expected that application of robots 
remains also limited for some time to come, given the need for flexibility and improvisation on the 
workplace. The reasons which have given the sector its traditional handicraft character and dependence 
on skilled labour are not likely to change in the foreseeable future. 
Given the nature of the industry, the possibilities for further productivity increases through 
mechanization and automation of the production process are limited. As construction is first and foremost 
'organization', that is getting the equipment, materials and specialized workers in time and in the required 
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quantity and quality at the site for assemblage, further increases in efficiency are mostly sought through 
more rationaliz.ation and reorganization. 
Hence, many recent innovations in work organization aim at 'Just-In-Tune' management: the 
improvement of the coordinated supply of the input-factors machinery, materials and labour on the 
building site and minimiz.ation of stocks of materials and of idleness of machinery and labour. This is 
done, among others through: 
- Project information systems, to monitor progress and costs of large projects. 
- Expert systems for the strategic planning of construction projects. 
- The increased use of leasing of machinery. 
- The increased use of subcontracting and labour-only subcontracting, both to minimiz.e costs of idle 
production factors and to extemaliz.e risk to smaller firms and groups of workers. 
Another recent organizational innovation is 'Fast Track Construction'. Such systems allow for the 
overlapping of design and construction activities, to permit simultaneous construction of early delivery 
elements while late delivery elements are still under design. By speeding up construction such programs 
help to reduce costs. 
A further integration of the design and construction phases is realized in so-called 'Design-Build' 
programs. This integration should reduce costs, increase efficiency, speed-up construction, and improve 
quality management. Whereas cost minimization in traditional construction is aimed at through an 
'adversarial model' (concentrating on price competition and playing off contractors against each other in 
public tendering procedures), the 'Design-Build' program underlies a more 'cooperative model' of cost 
reduction. The contractor, with his practical knowledge of actual building, is engaged to advise regularly 
on the design of the project and its implementation, which are both open to modification. There is a 
continuous feedback between engineers/architects and builders. Given the more permanent relation 
between designers and builders, in this model tendering is less important as a way of procurement of 
work. An example is the construction of the Dartford-Thurrock bridge over the river Thames, east of 
London, the largest cable-stayed span bridge in Europe: "Although outside consultants molded the bridge's 
conceptual design, contractor influence has affected the project since its conception. Design has been kept 
simple and practical. This is most obvious at the roadway level, where there are no fancy details or 
connections to slow crews. Simplicity is also a feature of main span erection. Site engineers believe that 
all the contractor's inputs have helped keep the project on schedule. No one has ever built such a large 
and complex crossing so fast."(Reina 1991) 
Given the limitations to mechanization and automation, it is to be expected that further attempts at 
improving productivity in construction will continue along the lines sketched. They will strengthen the 
position of both large and small firms and hence magnify the split in the sector along the line of firrn-
size. The new organizational techniques mentioned can be applied best by larger firms. Productivity gains 
derived from them will hence give larger firms a competitive edge. However, these firms will tend to 
subcontract more and more parts of the production process, thus maintaining or even enlarging market 
niches for smaller (specialized) firms. 
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5.5. Politkal Trends 
5.5.1. NatiooaJ Trends 
The construction sector has traditionally been highly dependent on the state, acting in various roles, 
that of customer, of regulator, and of business-cycle manager. These interventions have at least partly 
been motivated by the desire to provide governance arrangements to help solve the problems of 
uncertainty and variability for the industry. Possible future political trends could exert contradictory 
influences on the degree and nature of the dependence of construction on the state. 
First of all, there are some tendencies that work towards a reduction of this dependence. The 
international public policy fashion of 'less state', translated into deregulation, decentralization and 
privatization, has not left the sector untouched, and, although certainly over its zenith, may continue for 
a while, in some countries more (GB) than in others. It has led already to less detailed building codes 
and wning laws, more flexible or even liberalized rent-policies in those countries that had rent-control, 
privatization of infrastructural works otherwise commissioned by public agencies, such as toll-roads and 
toll-bridges (e.g. the Chunnel, the Thames Bridge east of London), and replacement or supplement of 
public housing programs by programs fostering private home-ownership (property acquisition saving 
schemes, tax relief for mortgages, housing grants, renovation subsidies). 
The retreat of the state has also been motivated by financial problems. Ever increasing budget deficits, 
rising costs of social security and other welfare state programs (aging of the population, persistent 
unemployment), have forced many states to moderate their spending programs for public works, thus 
reducing their role as customer of the construction industry. Such financial constraints produced a sizeable 
drop in public expenditure on infrastructure in the 1980s. 
A certain disillusionment with counter-cyclical demand management in construction, which often turned 
out to work pro-cyclical in the end, because of delays in decisionmaking (the result of recent more 
elaborated protections in administrative law against decisions of public agencies) has reduced the 
determination to coordinate and manage public works programs with an eye on the business-cycle. Such 
coordination was always already difficult, as works commissioning agencies tend to be more concerned 
with satisfying the by them as urgently perceived need for roads, road repairs, hydraulic works, public 
offices, than with the more abstract concept of correcting for business-cycle fluctuations. It will become 
even more difficult when coordinating agencies loose the belief in the effectiveness of their counter-
cyclical interventions. 
The tendencies, working towards a reduction of the dependence of construction on the state, are offset 
by some others, working in the opposite direction. Environmental concerns exert pressure for more and 
stricter regulation of the quality of building materials used or allowed, of building methods, and of 
building sites, wning and urban planning. Apprehension over black labour and corruption under welfare 
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state programs produce calls for stricter regulation and control of subcontracting and labour oontractS. 
Extraordinarily rising housing costs in major urban agglomerations (e.g. in Germany where the salary of 
many public and private workers can hardly afford them a one-room dwelling) inc.rease the demand for 
rent control and housing subsidies. Hence deregulation pressures are accompanied by pressures for 
regulation. 
Although the financing of public investment in construction may become more problematic, new needs 
will continue to arise. The population growth and migrations, and especially the new forms of social 
inequality mentioned above, will maintain or increase the demand for cheap public housing. High speed 
railroads integrating Europe also physically will demand huge infrastructural investments and are already 
on the planning boards. The clean-up of polluted soil under former industrial sites requires large earth 
moving capacity. And the renovation or renewal of aging and decaying sewage systems, harming the 
environment by contaminating the ground water, will become a major building project in many countries 
for years to come. Furthermore, public works programs, even if no longer used in counter-cyclical 
economic policies, will be called for to alleviate the persistent long-term unemployment. 
What the exact net result of these opposing trends in regulation and public investment on overall state 
intervention in construction will be is hard to predict. However, one can safely say that such opposing 
trends will continue to emerge also in the further future. And it is also not too risky to forecast that 
construction will remain highly dependent on the state as regulator and as customer. This characteristic 
of construction will remain rather stable. 
5.S.2. International Trends 
However, the nature of the state on which construction is dependent is changing as a result of 
international political trends, especially the European integration process. The EC is already attempting 
to harmonize technical standards in construction and rules for public tendering, with its Construction 
Coordination Directive (Baukoordinierungsrichtlinie) and its Construction Products Directive. The latter 
establishes quality and safety standards for the obtainment of EC-marks, EC-certificates and CE-
declarations of conformity, which give a product access to the entire single market. In time, a large share 
of national regulations and provisions concerning construction, such as building codes, safety requirements, 
quality management control, tendering procedures, contract specifications, cartel arrangements, vocational 
training, research and development, etc. could be centralized and harmonized at the EC-level. 
This will first of all require the industry to direct its lobby-acitivities more and more towards Brussels 
(a process which will most likely facilitate the formating and strengthening of EC-wide business' 
associations). Secondly, harmonization of technical standards could facilitate the use of economies-of-
scale and industrial building methods, thus reducing construction costs and strengthening the position of 
larger firms, capable of applying such methods. By reducing the costs of building materials, economies-
of-scale could paradoxically make the sector in relative terms more labour intensive and hence more 
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sensitive to labour relations, wage negotiations, etc. (As costs of raw materials decline, labour costs 
increase as percentage of the total) Thirdly, centralization and harmonization could further break-down 
regional market segmentation and facilitate construction abroad, as is of course the intention of the 
European Commission. Even though cr~-border 'exports' in construction will always remain limited. due 
to the necessity to produce on site of consumption, it is to be expected that such 'exports' will increase. 
Th.is could strengthen the position of the larger firms - which are better able to exploit this opportunity -
vis-a-vis the smaller ones. 
Another major international political trend has been the end of the cold war and the opening up of 
under- or rather, one-sidedly developed Eastern Europe. These countries have a huge need for 
infrastructural investments - for new or renovated roads, railroads, telecommunication cable-networks, 
urban renewal - and for the drastic renovation, reconstruction or replacement of almost the complete 
housing stock. Given the scale of the obsolescence of construction products, this need is likely to remain 
high for some decades to come. If financial means can be found to translate this societal need into 
spending-powerful demand, there will be much work for construction. The more so as governments in 
these countries may use investments into construction not only or so much to stabilize, but more 
specifically to activate the economy, to ignite economic recovery. And indeed, In the one former East 
European country where financial means are in large amounts available, the new German Lander, 
economic recovery is spearheaded by large infrastructural investments by the German state. 
This new need is of course first of all likely to be satisfied by, and hence to stimulate, the local 
construction industry in Eastern Europe, given the immobile nature of the products and the dependence 
on local suppliers, but also given the desire to use construction investments as a means to alleviate local 
unemployment. However, Western building know-how might be needed. Especially the construction 
industry in the neighboring countries (Germany, Austria, Sweden) and in those sectors with specific skills 
(tunneling, hydraulics, drilling, turn-key development projects) might profit from this demand. 
Furthermore, the larger firms, which already have experience with building abroad, might pitch in into 
this market Hence this development is likely to give larger firms a competitive edge over smaller ones. 
The new possibilities, offered by the markets in Eastern Europe, could offset the expected decline in 
demand in the Third World Countries. Safar, western construction firms realized a large share of their 
construction 'exports' in developing countries. However, the huge financial debts of these countries are 
likely to decrease the importance of these markets. Already now, governments are not able to pay western 
construction firms for projects carried out. These problems might even be enhanced as western-
industrialized nations shift some of their development aid to Eastern Europe and Russia. 
The opening-up of Eastern Europe will have one other major consequence. The former iron-curtain 
will become a borderline connecting - rather than separating - high wage countries in the west with low 
wage countries in the east, similar to the US-Mexican border. Eastern Europe will become, as Mexico, 
a supplier of cheap labour, either in the form of legal or illegal migrants (that is, black labour), or in 
the form of labour for new establishments of western firms just across the border. For the construction 
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this will mean both the opportunity to use, or rather abuse, black labour, thus exerting pressure on wage-
levels, reducing costs, increasing labour market segmentation, and weakening trade unions (see above); 
and to use East-European labour for construction projects abroad, just as western construction firms 
now often use Pakistani or Chinese workers on such projects. 
The relatively high dependence of construction on the state implies a dependence on public policy 
choices, on willful decisions, and hence on the many unpredictable developments and events that could 
affect such policy choices: changes in party dominance, new government coalitions, new unforeseen policy 
problems such as the oil crisis of 1973 or the revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989, etc. This makes on 
the one hand prognoses as to the effect of politica change factors more difficult. On the other hand, this 
dependence makes it easier for public policy makers to influence developments in the construction sector. 
The high degree of intervention implies greater possibilities for steering and control. Therefore, it will 
especially in this sector be useful to consider various scenarios dependent on basic public policy choices. 
This will be done in the next chapter. 
5.6. Change Factors and Firm-Size 
Notwithstanding this dependence on politics, many of the characteristics, listed in chapter one, make 
for stability over time: the continued basic need for housing, building on site of consumption, one-off 
production, importance of handicraft methods, dependence on local markets, the predictable and gradual 
aging of buildings, etc. They make for continued and in the long-term stable demand and limited 
possibilities for concentration and automation of production. Construction has been an important 
economic sector in the past and is likely to remain so in the future. It is neither a sunrise nor a sunset 
industry. Developmental sector models such as those based on the product-cycle do not apply to 
construction. Hence, most change factors will only marginally affect the industry. 
The change factors could however influence the organi:zational structure of the industry, especially the 
position of, and differentiation between, large and small firms, or SMEs and TNEs. Various technological 
(integration of design and construction, pre-fabrication), economic (volatility of interest rates) and 
political factors (opening of new markets in the east, harmoni:zation of technical standards facilitating 
building elsewhere, making public tenders accessible to foreign firms) favor larger, internationally oriented 
firms. Hence, the degree of concentration could increase through internal growth of firms and mergers. 
Horizontal cooperation through joint ventures and building combinations may also increase. 
Notwithstanding such competitive advantages for smaller firms, small firms will remain dominant within 
construction. There are also some change factors which bolster their position. The demographic and 
cultural trends towards individuali:zation, small-scale housing, and higher quality could favor small local 
handicraft firms. The increasing importance of renovation as the post-war housing stock is aging, also 
provides work for small maintenance firms. Thirdly, the growing tendency of larger firms to subcontract 
1 
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work to general or specialized small contractors (e.g. leasers of specialized machinery and skilled 
operators), as pan of 'just-in-time' work management or as pan of a strategy to externalize risk under 
oompetitive pressure, will also maintain or create market niches for small firms. 
Hence, there will be a place for both large and small firms in the future in construction. Both types 
of firms cater to different needs and markets. Their mutual relation could become both more cooperative 
and adversarial Mutual dependence could for the base for the formation of rather stable networks of 
small (specialized) subcontractors around larger firms. Especially foreign firms will be in need for 
assistence from local small companies. However, competition between them could also increase as 
technological developments and harmonization of standards and building codes h~lp in breaking down 
regional market segmentation. Larger firms may increasingly enter other local markets, either in their own 
or in foreign countries, e.g. by establishing local subsidiaries, thus entering in competition with the local 
firms that once dominated those markets. Widely spread sewage-renovation plans, for example, could 
induce specialized firms to offer their specific knowledge on various local markets. 
The further differentiation between SMEs and TNEs will add to the flexibility of the industry as a 
whole, and its competitive position regarding the US and Japanese construction industry, that is, in sofar 
as there is any real competition between these countries in construction. 
5.7. Change Factors and the Various Types of National Industries. Convergence? 
How will the change factors affect the various types of national construction industries, as distinguished 
in chapter 3? Which ones will be better geared to capitalize on future challenges and to adapt to 
upcoming constraints in their environment? Will there be a convergence or divergence of types? 
Obviously, every country needs it own construction industry, and competition between national 
industries is and will likely remain limited in this sector. Concentration of production in some countries, 
in the context of efficient international division of labour, will not happen in this sector. Hence, all 
national industries wil survive. However, the various types have so far still different competitive 
advantages (see chapter 3). 
The 'rest does poor' and 'catching up' countries on the western and southern flanks of Europe (IRL, 
GB, P, E, I, GR) find their strength (high profits, high growth-rates in P, E, GB) in low prices thanks 
to low wages. They are low in labour productivity but are catching up. Recent investment ratios are high 
and so are increases in wages. These countries are low also in concentration (except for Britain), but high 
in self-employment and in relative importance of the sector in the national economy. They find more 
work in new housing construction than in renovation, and as a result, the average age of houses is low 
(except IRL, GR). In short, they are traditional industries, high in external competitiveness but low in 
internal cohesion. 
The 'established modernizers', 'social welfare oriented', and stabilizing' northern and middle European 
countries (NL, DK. S, D, A, CH, F) by contrast pay their workers high wages (except F and A) and give 
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the job-security (low self-employment) and safe working conditions (except A and CH), hence have to 
calculate high prices (except NL and F), but derive competitive strength (moderate growth, high in CH) 
from high labour productivity, and relatively high concentration (except for CH), and (except for D) are 
rather active in building abroad. Because they are already well-developed, their investment rate is lower, 
but some (D, DK) invest heavily in skilled labour. They are high in external competitiveness and high 
in internal cohesion. 
A future convergence between these categories of national construction industries is possible and even 
likely, especially as EC-integration continues. The traditional low wage, low productivity countries are 
catching up with high growth rates, investments in modem machinery, and increasing wage and price 
levels. So far, their wage and price increases have been offset internationally by regular devaluations of 
the national currencies (recently again GB, I, and E). But eventual monetary union in Europe will prevent 
this in the future. While the traditional southern and western industries will converge 'upwards' to higher 
price levels, the expensive established modernizers ini the north and center of Europe could experience 
'downward' pressures. Many of them are located on the borders of eastern Europe (D, A, DF, S) and they 
will be the first to encounter the effects on wages and prices from migrant-workers and black labour from 
Eastern European countries, or from migrants from low-wage countries within the EC itself. This could 
further slow down investment and concentration in these countries as it may give smaller labour intensive 
firms a competitive edge. It will be less risky for an established large firm to subcontract work to small 
firms which may employ black labour than to hire black labour itself. 
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'- PROSPECTS AND SCENARIOS 
Typical for the oonstruction industry is a relative stability over time. This holds first of all for the 
demand for its products, for housing, renovation and civil engineering works, and hence for its siz.e and 
relative importance in the national economies. On average in EC countries, the sector has been 
responsible for about 7 percent of total employment. As said, it is neither a sunrise nor a sunset industry. 
In the long run there is no spectacular growth nor spectacular decline. This is likely to remain so. 
Secondly, the stability holds for many of the characteristics of the sector: building on site of consumption, 
one-off production, handicraft building methods, dominance of small firms, limited foreign competition. 
Thus e.g. the sector is not likely to suddenly change into a hi-tech sector. Some product and process 
innovations could be made, but overall the sector will keep its handicraft orientation. Toe organizational 
technique of flexible specialization, which has characterized the sector traditionally will remain dominant, 
the more so as it is considered now to be a future trend in other sectors. Only in this sense the old-
fashioned construction technology moves to the forefront of innovation. Thirdly, there will be relative 
stability in the main problems with which the sector will be confronted. In general terms, they will remain 
those posed by uncertainty and variability. They could, because of various change factors, only become 
more intense. 
Nevertheless, within these margins there are differences in construction industries, over time, as well 
as between nations. The foregoing chapters have outlined differences in performance and in governance 
arrangements of national construction industries. Such differences point to the possibility of distinctive 
routes to development, in the past as well as in the future. 
Such differences could be the result of conscious design, as two characteristics make the sector rather 
susceptible to strategic choice, to political steering and regulation. First of all, the traditional dependence 
of the sector on the state as major customer, regulator and business-cycle manager, implies that the state 
has many ways and instruments to influence developments in the sector. Secondly, the relative absence 
of foreign competition, for the EC-industry from Japan or the USA. means that such steering and 
regulation could be relatively effective. It will not be undercut my the competition from foreign, 
unregulated products on the market.a s is the case in many other non-sheltered sectors. 
Furthermore, the absence of foreign competition implies that the maintenance and improvement of 
external competitiveness does not necessarily have to be a major policy goal of public and private actors 
in this sector. That leaves room for other policy goals to direct future development of the industry, the 
most important being societal efficiency (effective and efficient satisfaction of the demand for cheap and 
good quality building products) and internal cohesion or equity within the industry itself. 
These consideration make it opportune to consider and distinguish various developmental scenarios on 
the basis of political criteria. Other scenario-types would of course also have been possible. One could 
use economic criteria, and distinguish scenarios on the basis of high and low overall economic growth; 
one could discuss scenarios on the basis of demographic change factors, e.g. high and low migration to 
Europe; or one could use technological criteria, e.g. a scenario on the basis of continued separation of 
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design and oonstruction and one on the basis of increasing intermingling of the two. Given the 
susccpu"bllity to political choices, it seemed us useful to take political choice as a criterium for scenarios. 
The more so as political integration in the EC makes it a question of the day. Integration seems to bring 
fundamental changes in sectoral governance patterns. 
The bureaucrats and lawyers in Brussels and Luxemburg seem to interpret the European agreements 
on unhindered cross-national competition and free movement of production factors as motives and 
licenses to break down all governance arrangements which correct - i.e. 'hinder' - the markeL National 
forms of state regulation of sectors are declared illegal or are being undercut, cartels are being outlawed, 
and a variety of other forms of self-regulation by industry, whether internal agreements of business 
associations or oontracts among such associations do or could come under attack. Competition policy 
dominates over industrial policy considerations. Thus the EC gradually extends a liberal, almost libertarian 
model to all EC-countries and threatens other established and proven governance arrangements, such 
as corporatist concertation and state regulation. 
This development prompts us to distinguish scenarios on the basis of political ideology: a liberal-
pluralist/liberatarian scenario, a fully corporatist one, and a moderate corporatist one. What would be the 
outcome of each? Which scenarios enhance the performance of the construction industry in terms of 
societal and dynamic efficiency and equity (or internal cohesion). 
A liberal scenario would turn out to be a 'nightmare'. There are many causes of market failure in 
construction which imply that allocation and coordination purely through the market - as the liberal 
scenario wants - would produce disastrous results. Deregulation, 'freeing' of the market would first of all 
increase competition so much that it would become destructive. As argued in the foregoing chapters, 
many characteristics work towards this: the tendering procedure which creates power asymmetries on the 
market; the limited amount of fixed capital needed and small average firm-size allows for easy market 
entry and exit, etc. Deregulation would: increase the number of market entrants; increase bancrupties, 
leaving debtors unpaid and customers with building works half finished; bancrupt firms would - under 
conditions of continued high unemployment forcing workers to start their own firm - enter the market 
again under a new name, thus maintaining overcapacity at a high level; contractors would again become 
forced to calculate under cost-price; they would not earn enough to finance investments and research and 
development activities; the high degree of uncertainty would also frustrate long-term investment planning 
and make businessmen even more short-term profit oriented (Traxler and Unger 1991); hence in the long 
run productivity gains would stagnate and decline in relative terms; pressure to work fast would sollicit 
carelessness and increase the already high rate of accidents on the workplace; wages would come under 
downward pressure; contractors would become more tempted to adultarate building materials and the 
information asymmetries would allow for this. It is not easy for the customer to estimate the quality of 
the product he buys or has bought; typical collective goods such as vocational training programs would 
no longer be provided, thus also threatening long-term efficiency. 
In short, one could end up with a low cost, low wage, low productivity industry which poses high risks 
not only to the contractors but also to suppliers, customers and workers, an industry which performs poor 
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in terms of dynamic efficiency. equity and stability over time. The problems could even become 
yet greater as economists predict increasing uncertainty and stronger fluctuations on financial and 
product markets as a result of internationalization (Gretschmann 1992, Nowotny 1991). One only 
has to look to the economic performance of those national industries where liberalism is the 
dominant value, the US and Britain. The continuous devaluation of their currencies is probably a 
good indication of their performance, of the trust of speculators in these economies. 
Of course, the sector would try to take countermeasures to reduce uncertainty and variability. 
The competitive pressures would be high enough. Forbidden formal self-regulatory arrangements 
would be replaced by informal network structures: secret, illegal and uncontrollable cartels as are 
occasionally uncovered in Germany where cartels have been forbidden; or Mafia-networks as exist 
in the US construction industry. Furthermore, horizontal cooperation and concertation would be 
replaced by 'hierarchies•. Firms would have a greater incentive to merge, thus increasing the degree 
of concentration (as it does in Britain), possibly to the detriment of smaller firms. 
Hence, for good reasons, many countries have introduced various forms of regulation in the past 
in construction, to reduce uncertainty in price bidding, to off set the power of the principal in 
tendering, to limit market entry, to improve the 'quality' of entrepreneurship, to guarantee product 
quality, or to mitigate and order competition in other ways. These have either taken the form of 
state regulation or of self-regulation by the industry. The absence of foreign competition has 
facilitated the effectiveness of such forms of regulation. While EC-competitive policy follows 
liberal ideological orthodoxies, an EC-industrial policy should learn from these experiences. Such 
a corporatist scenario would not only keep such governance arrangements intact, but would also 
extend them to other countries which do not yet have them. Thus e.g. it is imaginable that other 
countries would adopt the highly effective vocational training system of the German Kammern and 
guilds. This would not only ensure the long-term viability of the industry, but would strengthen 
the position of small firms, by providing them witha minimal degree of market protection, and by 
emphasizing the artisan character of the industry. 
This scenario runs of course the danger of monopolistic closure with its detrimental effects 
predicted by economists: undeserved monopoly profits, externalization of costs and exploitation of 
consumers, lethargy, lack of incentive to improve productivity by investment, etc. Such have 
indeed been the consequences of the more extreme corporatist countries, such as Austria (see also 
the low scores of Austria in the performance evaluation in chapter 3), where e.g. consumers are 
exploited (high prices, poor quality of services, short business hours) in the interest of business and 
workers. Such consequences would be prevented by maintaining a reasonable degree of competition. 
The industrial structure of construction, thousands of small firms, etc., should guarantee that. Thus, 
a moderate corporatist scenario would produce an EC-construction industry as it is found in the 
moderately corporatist countries Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden or Switzerland: high in wages, 
productivity, safe on the workplace, good quality housing, moderate prices, in short, high in 
dynamic efficiency, equity and stability . 
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